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The end-to-end argument describes the communication between a client and server using
functionality that is located at the end points of a distributed system. From a security and
privacy perspective, clients only need to trust the server they are trying to reach instead
of intermediate system nodes and other third-party entities. Clients accessing the Inter-
net today and more specifically the World Wide Web have to interact with a plethora of
network entities for name resolution, traffic routing and content delivery. While individual
communications with those entities may some times be end to end, from the user’s perspec-
tive they are intermediaries the user has to trust in order to access the website behind a
domain name. This complex interaction lacks transparency and control and expands the
attack surface beyond the server clients are trying to reach directly. In this dissertation,
we develop a set of novel design principles and architectures to reduce the number of third-
party services and networks a client’s traffic is exposed to when browsing the web. Our
proposals bring additional intelligence to the client and can be adopted without changes to
the third parties.
Websites can include content, such as images and iframes, located on third-party servers.
Browsers loading an HTML page will contact these additional servers to satisfy external
content dependencies. Such interaction has privacy implications because it includes context
related to the user’s browsing history. For example, the widespread adoption of “social
plugins” enables the respective social networking services to track a growing part of its
members’ online activity. These plugins are commonly implemented as HTML iframes
originating from the domain of the respective social network. They are embedded in sites
users might visit, for instance to read the news or do shopping. Facebook’s Like button
is an example of a social plugin. While one could prevent the browser from connecting to
third-party servers, it would break existing functionality and thus be unlikely to be widely
adopted. We propose a novel design for privacy-preserving social plugins that decouples
the retrieval of user-specific content from the loading of third-party content. Our approach
can be adopted by web browsers without the need for server-side changes. Our design has
the benefit of avoiding the transmission of user-identifying information to the third-party
server while preserving the original functionality of the plugins.
In addition, we propose an architecture which reduces the networks involved when rout-
ing traffic to a website. Users then have to trust fewer organizations with their traffic.
Such trust is necessary today because for example we observe that only 30% of popular web
servers offer HTTPS. At the same time there is evidence that network adversaries carry
out active and passive attacks against users. We argue that if end-to-end security with a
server is not available the next best thing is a secure link to a network that is close to the
server and will act as a gateway. Our approach identifies network vantage points in the
cloud, enables a client to establish secure tunnels to them and intelligently routes traffic
based on its destination. The proliferation of infrastructure-as-a-service platforms makes it
practical for users to benefit from the cloud. We determine that our architecture is practical
because our proposed use of the cloud aligns with existing ways end-user devices leverage it
today. Users control both endpoints of the tunnel and do not depend on the cooperation of
individual websites. We are thus able to eliminate third-party networks for 20% of popular
web servers, reduce network paths to 1 hop for an additional 20% and shorten the rest.
We hypothesize that user privacy on the web can be improved in terms of transparency
and control by reducing the systems and services that are indirectly and automatically
involved. We also hypothesize that such reduction can be achieved unilaterally through
client-side initiatives and without affecting the operation of individual websites.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Distributed systems are better served when high level functionality is implemented at their
endpoints rather than the middle [95]. From a security and privacy perspective, clients only
need to trust the server they are trying to reach instead of intermediate system nodes and
other third-party entities. Clients accessing the Internet today and more specifically the
World Wide Web have to interact with a plethora of network entities for name resolution,
traffic routing and content delivery. While individual communications with those entities
may some times be end to end, from the user’s perspective they are intermediaries the user
has to trust in order to access the website behind a domain name. This complex interaction
lacks transparency and control and expands the attack surface beyond the server clients
are trying to reach directly. We draw the distinction between second and third parties
where the former operate under the authority of the primary service users are trying to
reach. For example, when a website delegates part of its content or functionality to a
service operating under that website’s domain the service is considered a second party and
the users’ trust towards the website extends to that service. Content delivery networks
and same-site analytics services can be instances of second parties. On the other hand,
services under their own distinct domains with symbiotic relationships to the website are
third parties and users need to trust them separately. Routing networks on the Internet
and cross-site social or advertising services are instances of third parties.
A client communicating with a web server exchanges traffic over a series of distinctly
owned networks spanning organizational and national borders. Unless the client agrees on
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an end-to-end encrypted transport protocol with the server, all intermediate networks are
effectively part of the conversation between the two endpoints as they have the ability to
monitor and alter the information exchanged. End-user Internet service providers (ISPs),
including popular ones such as AT&T and Verizon, inject advertisements [93] and tracking
headers [10] [4] in the unencrypted HTTP traffic of their customers. They also tamper
with SMTP traffic [27] to disable its opportunistic encryption. Intelligence agencies eaves-
drop [47] on unencrypted traffic to piggyback on HTTP cookies for the purpose of tracking
individual users. In addition, they impersonate popular Internet services through man-
on-the-side attacks on unencrypted network paths for user exploitation and surveillance.
Finally, network adversaries [90] inject JavaScript code into unencrypted HTTP traffic in
transit to launch denial of service attacks.
Secure protocols, such as HTTPS, make the information exchanged inaccessible by in-
termediate nodes. This effectively abstracts a multi-party traffic exchange to a two-party
conversation. Recent efforts to make HTTPS more affordable [6] and easy to deploy [1]
are steps towards the right direction. Unfortunately a significant portion of web traffic still
traverses the network without any security. In this dissertation we evaluate the security
of 10,000 popular websites and find that only 30% support HTTPS. Translating HTTPS
support to user impact is an open challenge given different browsing patterns among users
and the subjective nature of private content served from individual sites. We therefore focus
on service configurations rather than the amount of traffic or distinct users to understand
how developers are building and maintaining the ecosystem. A similar study [91] focusing
on connections finds that 50% are done over HTTPS. We examine HTTPS-capable sites
and discover that 53% let their visitors default to plain-text HTTP. Overall only 56 of the
10,000 sites fully protect their users through a combination of HTTPS and HSTS preload-
ing. Even when HTTPS is available implementation vulnerabilities threaten its security.
Recent attacks such as FREAK [60], POODLE [85], Heartbleed [54], the work of AlFardan
et al. [58] and BEAST [64] have impacted hundreds of thousands of Internet services. To
make matters worse many of these services remain vulnerable months after the disclosure
of the attack and some of them will never be patched. In the case of FREAK, 45% of the
affected servers remained vulnerable 9 months post disclosure [50].
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The functionality offered by modern websites introduces additional privacy concerns
that cannot be addressed by the use of encryption between clients and servers. Websites
often include content, such as images and iframes, located on third-party servers. Browsers
loading an HTML page will contact these additional servers to satisfy external content
dependencies. Such interaction has privacy implications because it includes context related
to the user’s browsing history. It also lacks transparency since the browser’s address bar only
displays the address of the website visited directly. “Social plugins” enable websites to offer
personalized content by leveraging the social graph, and allow their visitors to seamlessly
share, comment, and interact with their social circles [19]. These plugins are provided by
services such as Facebook and are embedded by developers in the form of iframes in websites
users might visit, for instance to read the news or do shopping. Indicatively, as of June 2012,
more than two million websites had incorporated some of Facebook’s social plugins, while
more than 35% of the top 10,000 websites include Like buttons—a percentage three times
higher than just one year before [53]. Roesner et al. [94] show that in 2012 30% of the 100
most popular domains embed Facebook plugins. Englehardt et al. [69] show that in 2016
35% of 1 million popular websites feature Facebook plugins. Their findings demonstrate
that the presence of social plugins in popular websites has been consistent for almost a
decade. [8] They also show that social and advertising networks are the only third parties
with a large presence on the web. When visiting a web page, the browser will load such
third-party content by connecting to Facebook and in the process will transmit the URL
of the visited page along with any cookies available for the third-party domains. Facebook
cookies uniquely identify a user by name and the ubiquity of these plugins enables the social
network to learn a growing part of the user’s browsing history. In recent years Facebook has
started [32] taking advantage of social plugins to covertly profile its users. To make matters
worse, users lack adequate control since browsers interact with third parties automatically
when loading a page. Users could prevent the browser from connecting to these third-party
servers. Such practice has already been studied in the context of advertising networks by
the research community [71, 102] and millions of users have adopted browser add-ons that
employ blacklists to prevent contact with such servers. [2] However social plugins are a
unique case. Given that they bundle functionality with user tracking, preventing them
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from loading would break the functionality they offer and thus any such solution would be
unlikely to be widely adopted by users.
1.1 Hypothesis
Given current studies [69, 94] advertising and social networking services are the primary
third party content providers privy to the user’s browsing history. Given the existing
mitigations [71,102] against online advertisers we hypothesize that by addressing the privacy
concerns of social plugins user browsing history won’t leak to any third party found in
more than 10% of popular websites. Subsequently for third parties to reconstruct the view
social networks have of the user’s browsing activity they would have to collude among
themselves. Additionally, domain name resolution, traffic routing and content delivery are
the three essential services users have to rely on to browse the web. We hypothesize that
by protecting vulnerable traffic, such as plaintext TCP, from routing intermediaries users
will only need to trust DNS services and the website offering the content they are trying
to access. We also hypothesize that such reduction can be achieved unilaterally through
client-side initiatives and without requiring changes to the third-party services or networks.
We draw the distinction between second and third parties where the former are delegates
of the website’s content or functionality and operate under its authority. Content delivery
networks and same-site analytics services can be instances of second parties. The origin of
same-site analytics services is the website’s domain in contrast to social plugins which use
the origin of the social networking service and can extend their user tracking state across
sites. Similarly, a website’s domain name may resolve to the IP addresses of a content
delivery network which may also carry a TLS certificate for that website.
1.2 Thesis Statement
This thesis argues that the third parties involved when clients access the web can be ef-
fectively reduced by moving their functionality to the endpoints. Specifically clients can
leverage infrastructure-as-a-service platforms to deploy a secure network overlay that en-
ables them to reach a web server in a way that reduces the networks involved. We consider
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that by routing vulnerable traffic through the network overlay and therefore not exposing it
to the respective transit networks we are effectively removing them from the path. Ideally
the edges of the network overlay are the client and the web server and thus all network
intermediaries are effectively removed. Additionally we argue that clients have the techni-
cal capability to locally implement the content personalization offered by third-party social
plugins thereby eliminating the communication with the social network when loading a web
page. By eliminating communication with the social network when loading a page the user’s
browsing history is not leaked.
1.3 Contributions
• We identify the clustering of Internet services inside cloud providers and propose
strategically establishing encrypted tunnels to their networks to avoid exposing plain-
text traffic to the Internet.
• We define the following security-oriented metrics for routing traffic through our ar-
chitecture; (a) Number of autonomous systems (AS) plain-text traffic must traverse
to reach an Internet service. Ideally zero because the service is in the same network
as a tunnel exit. (b) Involvement of a particular trusted or untrusted AS.
• We implement and evaluate Topology-aware Network Tunnels (TNT) as IP routing
software. We address challenges in network measurements and system integration.
• We propose a novel design for privacy-preserving social plugins that i) prevents the
social network from tracking its members’ web activity, and ii) provides the same
functionality as existing plugins with no compromises in content personalization.
• We implement and evaluate SafeButton, a Firefox extension that provides privacy-
preserving versions of Facebook’s social plugins.
• We describe in detail a pure JavaScript implementation of our design that can be
offered by existing social networking services as a transparent service to their members.









Figure 1.1: A plethora of third-party entities are involved when users visit a website. From













Figure 1.2: This dissertation proposes a privacy-preserving design for personalized third-
party content as well as a secure transport overlay that effectively reduces the trusted
networks involved.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Preventing Third-party Tracking on the Web
The privacy implications of third-party content when users browse the web have been iden-
tified early on [20, 21, 75]. Subsequent studies have tried to quantify the pervasiveness of
tracking in general or among special groups of third parties including social networking ser-
vices. Mayer et al. [83] highlight the threats against user privacy by the cross-site tracking
capabilities of third-party web services. The authors detail a plethora of tracking tech-
nologies used by the embedded pages of advertisement, analytics, and social networking
services. Their work demonstrates the high level of sophistication in web tracking tech-
nologies. Krishnamurthy et al. [79] study privacy leaks in online social networking services.
They identify the presence of embedded content from third-party domains in the interac-
tions of a user with the social network itself and stress that the combination with personal
information inside a social network could pose a significant threat to user privacy. Roesner
et al. [94] study the tracking ecosystem of third-party web services and discuss current de-
fenses, including third-party cookie blocking. They identify cases where tracking services
actively try to evade such restrictions by bringing themselves in a first party position, e.g.,
by spawning pop-up windows. Moreover, the authors present cases in which services are
treated as first parties when visited directly and intentionally by the users, and at the same
time appear embedded as third parties in websites, as is the case with social networking
services and their social plugins. Overall, they conclude that current restrictions imposed
















Figure 2.1: The privacy-functionality tradeoff when addressing third-party tracking.
by browsers against third-party tracking are not foolproof, and at the same time find more
than 500 tracking services, some with the capability to capture more than 20% of a user’s
browsing behavior. Libert [80] carries out a large-scale study of the HTTP requests made
when visiting a website and finds that in the majority of cases third-party services are in-
volved. The author highlights that users lack visibility into the involvement of those third
parties, points out that few large companies are responsible for most of the services and
calls for additional scrutiny of their practices. Interestingly the most popular third parties
are analytics and social networking services, which bundle user-facing functionality with
invisible activity tracking.
From a privacy perspective, when third-party content providers do not have the ability
to track users on the web, they are no longer involved in the user’s browsing activity.
Existing work tries to achieve that in three ways: 1) communicating the user’s decision to
opt out of tracking, 2) preventing the browser from sending user-identifying information to
third-parties and 3) preventing the browser from connecting to them.
The W3C Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [44] enables websites to
express their privacy policy in a standardized format that is easy to parse by web browsers
that later are supposed to communicate this information to users. Unfortunately it has
not gained support due to the complexity involved in developers expressing their privacy
policy and the effort required from users in understanding it. Moreover there is currently
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no way to force the adoption of P3P or enforce a website’s P3P policy. Most web browsers
no longer support P3P.
Do Not Track [7] is a browser technology which enables users to signal, via an HTTP
header, that they do not wish to be tracked by websites they do not explicitly visit. Unfor-
tunately there are no guarantees that such a request will be honored by the receiving site
or not.
Given the limitations of policy-based privacy initiatives, existing research focuses on
technical measures that attempt to identify and prevent tracking. Web browsers provide
the option of preventing third parties from storing client-side state using HTTP cookies.
Unfortunately there is no consistent behavior across browsers with some only preventing
third parties from writing cookies. Third parties can work around such weak isolation by
temporarily becoming first parties using a pop-up window or redirecting the entire page to
their domain and back. Furthermore cookies are not the only method for storing client-side
state which is why Jackson et al. [75] propose extending the same-origin isolation to the
content cache, DNS cache and browsing history.
The plethora of ways to explicitly or implicitly store client-side state [76] has lead to
an arms race. In response, a holistic approach to managing client-side state describes
containerized browser instances either specific to a particular site [61] or in the form of an
ephemeral browsing session [56]. In private or “incognito” windows the browser does not
preserve any client-side state in an attempt to prevent long-term user tracking as opposed
to addressing individual state-keeping mechanisms. Because of the rigid nature of this
browsing mode it is an opt-in feature in all browsers that implement it.
In certain cases third parties are able to track users by merely being present on the
pages they visit and without the need to set cookies or other state. Information available
to them through the JavaScript API can result in a uniquely identifying set of values, a
fingerprint, that is based not only on the software [67] but also the hardware [55,86].
Tracking protection offered by Firefox [33] along with privacy-oriented browser exten-
sions such as EFF’s Privacy Badger [9] use a block list of known third-party trackers to
prevent the browser from connecting to the respective domains. While stopping traffic ex-
change with tracking domains addresses even the most resilient forms of fingerprint-based
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tracking it creates a tradeoff between privacy and functionality.
Social networking services and other third-party providers of personalized content com-
bine functionality users enjoy with the tracking of their browsing activity. Services such as
Facebook that users visit both directly and by interacting with their content on other pages
present challenges to the first and third-party isolation logic discussed above. Moreover they
point out the usability issues with ephemeral browsing sessions when users have to log in
to Facebook every time. Finally they highlight the need for privacy-preserving technologies
that do not negatively impact functionality.
There has been significant work towards user control over the data provided to social
networking services. The privacy implications of third-party applications installed in a user’s
profile within the social networking service are similar to the service being embedded in web
pages. Existing research [68, 70, 99] tries to provide user control through a combination of
encrypted data uploaded to the service for which the user has the key and information flow
tracking to regulate access. Facecloak [82] shields a user’s personal information from a social
network and any third-party interaction by providing fake information to the social network
and storing actual sensitive information in an encrypted form on a separate server. The
authors in FlyByNight [81] propose the use of public key cryptography among friends in a
social networking service so as to protect their information from a curious social provider
and potential data leaks.
When social networking services are embedded in web pages they provide personalized
content using information about the page they are embedded in and the user’s social data.
Privacy-preserving personalized content has been researched in the context of advertising.
Recent work has focused on how to support personalized advertisements without reveal-
ing the user’s personal information to the providing party. Adnostic [102] offers targeted
advertising while preserving the user’s privacy by having the web browser profile the user,
through the monitoring of his browsing history, and inferring his interests. It then down-
loads diverse content from the advertising server and selects which part of it to display to
the user. Similarly, RePriv [71] enables the browser to mine a user’s web behavior to in-
fer guidelines for content personalization, which are ultimately communicated to interested
sites. Content personalized in the context of social networking services is a unique challenge.
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Privacy research focusing on advertising prevents a website from building a profile for the
user. In this thesis we focus on the nature of social networking services where the user al-
ready has a profile because of their direct interaction with the service. We then identify the
need to decouple the identification step the user undergoes, to access their already existing
social profile, from their subsequent requests for content personalization on pages the social
networking service is embedded in.
Existing attempts to preserve user privacy are aligned with the general approach de-
scribed above where browsers refrain from connecting to social networking services embed-
ded as third parties. A series of browser add-ons exist [15,35] that block social plugins from
the web pages a user visits by removing them or preventing them from loading, in a manner
similar to what Adblock [2] does for advertisements. ShareMeNot [40,94] is a Firefox add-on
that strips user cookies from a series of HTTP requests that the web browser issues to load
social plugins. As a result, no user-identifying information is sent to the social network-
ing service until the user explicitly interacts with the social plugin. The downside of this
approach is that users are deprived of any personalized information offered by the plugin,
e.g., the number and names of any of their friends that might have already interacted with
a page. In other words, users view these social plugins as if they were logged out from the
respective social network (or browsing in “incognito” mode).
In this dissertation we argue that any privacy mitigation should not come at the cost
of the functionality third parties offer. Therefore we focus on providing the full content
personalization of existing social plugins while protecting user privacy.
2.2 Preventing Third-party Tracking on the Network
Two hosts exchanging traffic over the Internet have to rely on a plethora of intermediate
nodes and networks to forward their data. When the data is readable by anyone, interme-
diate nodes can observe and modify the data exchanged. Both client and server have to
trust all intermediate parties as they are effectively communicating with all of them at the
application level. Reis et al. [93] downloaded known HTML pages over HTTP and detected
ISPs injecting advertisements in the page. Weaver et al. [104] using a client-server testbed
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Table 2.1: Our proposal encrypts the entire path between the client and the destination
network by optimizing tunnel placement and traffic routing. The same logic in Tor would
compromise its anonymity properties.
found out that 14% of the measurements conducted showed evidence of a middlebox pro-
cessing the traffic. They identified such proxies in all four major U.S. mobile carriers. Using
the same testbed they discovered [5] that network operators, including a major U.S. ISP,
inject erroneous DNS replies for non-existent domains to redirect users to pages featuring
advertisements. Durumeric et al. [65] observed ISPs tampering with SMTP traffic to disable
its opportunistic encryption. Nakibly et al. [87] identified content injection that cannot be
attributed to edge ISPs and is more likely taking place at the Internet’s backbone.
End-to-end encrypted protocols such as TLS [45] reduce the capability of intermediate
parties to simple traffic forwarding and effectively offer a two-party interaction. When end-
to-end encryption is not available alternative approaches attempt to mitigate the privacy
implications.
To limit the exposure of their plain-text traffic some users connect to Virtual Private
Network (VPN) servers offering encrypted tunnels between the client’s device and some fixed
point in the Internet beyond which traffic is unencrypted. While such services protect from
a local network attacker, exposure to network adversaries might even increase as opposed to
a direct route without the VPN service. Since VPN gateways are not optimized to be close
to web servers user traffic might traverse more autonomous systems or even cross national
borders, e.g., from a US gateway to a European server. Even VPNs with diverse gateways
employ them without considering the destination of traffic.
Tor [63] is an anonymity network where traffic is encapsulated in layers of encryption
and usually travels between three nodes before the original TCP/UDP packet exits to the
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Internet. By design Tor attempts no correlation between the exit of an encrypted circuit
and the destination of traffic. Sherr et al. [97] propose the introduction of performance
metrics in anonymous routing systems to affect circuit selection. Even though their work
focuses within the anonymity network one could propose extending it so that exit nodes
consider the destination of traffic. That would compromise the anonymity Tor offers. Even
if someone were to give up anonymity we argue that the Tor network cannot carry user
traffic close to Internet services. Using the Tor network status protocol we studied 1010
exit nodes with the highest bandwidth consensus weight and found that only 1% of them
was located within major cloud networks. Meek [49] and domain fronting in general set
up HTTPS tunnels to the cloud and CDNs and use them as gateways to masquerade the
client’s connection to a blocked website or Tor bridge. The placement of gateways ignores
the location of the website and prefers networks an adversary is unlikely to unblock. As
a result, Tor serves a different purpose than this dissertation and the two architectures
complement each other. Table 2.1 summarizes their differences. Compared to the work
of Sherr et al. we offer a complete implementation, evaluate it end-to-end, and introduce
security metrics for routing decisions.
Overlay networks have been used in the past to recover from link failures in the under-
lying infrastructure and achieve better end-to-end performance. Savage et al. [96] propose
Detour, an overlay where its members periodically exchange performance metrics such as
RTT and packet loss and base their routing decisions on them thereby bypassing the Inter-
net’s native algorithms. LASTor [57] is a similar idea for Tor. Andersen et al. [59] in RON
use a similar architecture to quickly route around link failures. Both designs limit their
scope to members of the overlay and cannot be used for availability or performance guaran-
tees for the rest of the Internet. Participating nodes evaluate each other on a regular basis
which is something that does not scale well to the number of Internet services. Gummadi
et. al [74] use one-hop source routing (SOSR) to recover from link failures in well-connected
parts of the Internet. They maintain an overlay of virtual routers and clients use them as
proxies to probe and connect to arbitrary network destinations when their default route is
unable to deliver traffic. Our work differs from SOSR in two fundamental ways. In SOSR
the placement of routers is selected at random since this is more likely to offer alternative
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links to most network destinations. In contrast, this dissertation optimizes the placement
of TNT routers on the edges of the Internet, inside cloud networks where Internet services
form clusters. We also make routing decisions so as to carry encrypted traffic as close to the
destination as possible while SOSR prioritizes finding any available path around a failed
link. In terms of implementation we solve engineering challenges such as routing updates
in the presence of active client flows while SOSR reroutes traffic that is already failing.
LASTor is a modified Tor client which uses a static AS-level map of the Internet to predict
network paths and avoid circuits with the same AS at its edges. Astoria [88] follows a
similar approach. In this dissertation we carry out data plane measurements to reliably
construct the network path to a destination and reevaluate the path over time to account
for routing changes. Moreover both LASTor and Astoria focus on diversifying the ASes
involved in the edges of a Tor path. We minimize the length of the Internet path from a
client to a server which is a different objective, optionally avoiding specific ASes.




The design of privacy-preserving social plugins is driven by two key requirements: i) provide
identical functionality to existing social plugins in terms of content personalization and
user interaction, and ii) avoid the transmission of user-identifying information to the social
networking service before any user interaction takes place. The first requirement is necessary
for ensuring that users receive the full experience of social plugins, as currently offered by
the major social networking services. (SNS) Existing solutions against user tracking do
not provide support for content personalization, and thus are unlikely to be embraced by
SNSes and content providers. The second requirement is necessary for preventing SNSes
from receiving user-identifying information whenever users merely view a page and do not
interact with a social plugin.
We consider as user-identifying information any piece of information that can be used
to directly associate a social plugin instance with a user profile on the SNS, such as a cookie
containing a unique user identifier. The IP address of a device or a browser fingerprint can
also be considered personally identifying information, and could be used by a shady provider
for user tracking. However, the accuracy of such signals cannot be compared to the ability
of directly associating a visit to a page with the actual person that visits the page, due to
factors that introduce uncertainty [92] such as DHCP churn, NAT, proxies, multiple users
using the same browser, and other aspects that obscure the association of a device with
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the actual person behind it. Users can mitigate the effect of these signals to their privacy
by browsing through an anonymous communication network [63], and ensuring that their
browser has a non-unique fingerprint [67].
When viewed in conjunction, the two requirements seem contradicting. Content per-
sonalization presumes knowledge of the person for whom the content will be personalized.
Nevertheless, the approach we propose satisfies both requirements, and enables a social
plugin instance to render personalized content without revealing any user-identifying infor-
mation to the SNS.
3.2 Design
We examine the nature of current plugins and define it as the intersection of the user’s
social data, public data from the social graph and the content of the website the plugins are
embedded in. We define user data as any data contributed by the user to the social network
as well as additional data available to the user, for example, when a friend uploads content
on the social graph that is accessible by the user. Specifically we focus on social plugins
offered by Facebook and verify that their operation aligns with the above definition. We
empirically confirm that social plugins offered by other popular social networks, specifically
Twitter and Google+, also follow this design. We present our analysis on Facebook plugins
in Section 3.4.
Social plugins present the user with two different types of content: private information,
such as the names and pictures of friends who like a page, and public information, such as
the total number of “likes.” The main idea behind our approach is to maintain a local copy
of all private information that can possibly be needed for rendering any personalized content
for a particular user, and query the social networking service only for public information
that can be requested anonymously.
This approach satisfies our first requirement, since all the required private information
for synthesizing and presenting personalized content is still available to the social plugin
locally, while any missing public information can be fetched on demand. User interaction
is not hindered in any way, as user actions are handled in the same way as in existing
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social plugins. Our second requirement is also satisfied because all communication of a
privacy-preserving social plugin with the SNS for loading its content does not include any
user-identifying information. Only public information about the page might be requested,
which can be retrieved anonymously.
The whole process is coordinated by the Social Plugin Agent, which runs in the context
of the browser and has three main tasks: i) upon first run, gathers all private data that
might be needed through the user’s profile and social circle, and stores it in a local Data-
Store, ii) periodically, synchronizes the DataStore with the information available online by
adding or deleting any new or stale entries, and iii) whenever a social plugin is encountered,
synthesizes and presents the appropriate content by combining private, personalized infor-
mation from the local DataStore and public, non-personalized information through the SNS.
Maintaining a local copy of the user’s social information is a continuous process, and takes
place transparently in the background. Once all necessary information has been mirrored
during the bootstrapping phase, the DataStore is kept up to date periodically.
Using the Facebook Like button as a example, the private information that must be
stored locally for its privacy-preserving version should suffice for properly rendering any
possible instance of its personalized content for any third-party page the user might en-
counter. This can be achieved by storing locally all the “likes” that all of the user’s friends
have ever made, as well as the names and thumbnail pictures of the user’s friends. Note
that all the above information is available through the profile history of the user’s friends,
which is always accessible while the user is logged in.
Although keeping all this state locally might seem daunting at first, as we demonstrate
in Sec. 3.4.2, the required space for storing all the necessary private information for privacy-
preserving versions of all Facebook’s existing social plugins is just 5.4MB for the typical
case of a user with 190 friends, and 145MB for an extreme case of a user with 5,000 friends.
No information that is not accessible under the user’s credentials is ever needed, and daily
synchronization typically requires the transmission of a few kilobytes of data. We consider
the need to distribute viral content an atypical case and defer work towards an adaptive
synchronization policy to the future. From a design perspective our proposal could model
the user’s behavior by performing state synchronization as frequently as necessary while



























Figure 3.1: The loading phase of privacy-preserving social plugins. When a social plugin
is encountered (1), the Social Plugin Agent intervenes between the plugin and the SNS (2).
The agent requests (3) and receives (4) only publicly accessible content, e.g., the page’s
total number of “likes,” without revealing any user-identifying information to the SNS. The
agent then combines this data with personalized information that is maintained locally, and
presents the unified content to the user (5).
prioritizing data from friends the user is more likely to interact with.
Continuing with the Like button as an example, Fig. 3.1 illustrates the process of ren-
dering its privacy-preserving version. Upon visiting a third-party page, the Social Plugin
Agent requests from the SNS the total number of “likes” for that particular page, without
providing any user-identifying information (step 3). In parallel, it looks up the URL of the
page in the DataStore and retrieves the names and pictures of the friends that have liked
the page (if any). Once the total number of “likes” arrives (step 4), it is combined with the
local information and the unified personalized content is presented to the user (5).
Further optimizations are possible to avoid querying for non-personalized content at load
time. Depending on the plugin and the kind of information it provides, public information
for frequently visited pages can be cached, while public information for highly popular
pages can be prefetched. For example, information such as the total number of “likes”
for a page the user visits several times within a day can be updated only once per day to














Figure 3.2: Overall architecture of SafeButton. A Request Handler (1) intercepts the HTTP
requests of social plugins. Privacy-preserving implementations of the supported plugins (2)
combine public remote data (3b), which can be cached in the X-Cache for improving network
performance (3a), and private data from the user’s social circle, which is maintained locally
in the DataStore (4), and deliver the same personalized content (5) as the original plugins.
give an approximation of the page’s popularity among people the user is not friends with.
This allows the Social Plugin Agent to occasionally serve the Like button using solely local
information. Similarly, the SNS could regularly push to the agent the total number of
“likes” for the top 10K most “liked” pages. In both cases, the elimination of any network
communication on every cache hit not only reduces the rendering time, but also protects
the user’s browsing pattern even further.
3.3 Implementation
To explore the feasibility of our approach we have implemented SafeButton, an add-on for
Firefox (version 7.0.1) that provides privacy-preserving versions of existing social plugins.
SafeButton is written in JavaScript and XUL [31], and relies on the XPCOM interfaces of
Firefox to interact with the internals of the browser. Figure 3.2 provides an overview of
SafeButton’s main components, which are described below. A detailed description of how
the components are put together to handle a Like button is provided at the end of this
section.
Request Handler The main task of the Request Handler is to intercept the HTTP
requests of a social plugin at load time, and hand off the event to an appropriate callback
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handler function. The requests are intercepted using a set of filters based on signatures that
capture the target URL of each plugin. These signatures are received from the Social Plugin
Provider Interface, along with the callback handlers that should be invoked whenever a filter
is triggered. The Request Handler provides as an argument to these callbacks a reference
to the DOM of the page that contains the social plugin that triggered the filter.
We have implemented the Request Handler by registering an observer for HTTP requests
(httpon-modify-request notification) using XPCOM’s nsIObserverService. This allows
the inspection code to lie inline in the HTTP request creation process, and either intercept
and modify requests (e.g., by stripping HTTP cookies or other sensitive headers), or drop
them entirely when necessary.
Social Plugin Provider Interface The Social Plugin Provider Interface serves as an
abstraction between the Request Handler and different Provider Modules that support
the social plugins offered by different social networking services. This extensible design
enables more networks and plugins to be supported in the future. In the current version
of SafeButton, we have implemented a Provider Module for the social plugins offered by
Facebook. We take advantage of the Graph API [17] to download the user’s private social
information that needs to be stored locally, and access any other public content on demand.
Other social networks, for example Twitter and Google+, that offer similar plugins also
provide API for developer’s to access user data and interact with the service. Note that our
proposal does not depend on the presence of an API as our design leverages data already
available to users when they interact with the service. We should stress that, although an
option, we do not employ any kind of scraping to extract information available to users
through Facebook’s web interface. We argue that any effort from a social network to
terminate all avenues for users to access their own data would reduce transparency and
counter any claims it has made in favor of user privacy.
A Provider Module for a SNS consists of: i) the signatures that will be used by the
Request Handler for intercepting the HTTP requests of the platform’s social plugins, ii)
the callback handler functions that implement the core functionality of each social plugin
based on local and remote social information, and iii) the necessary logic for initializing the
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DataStore and keeping it up to date with the information that is available online.
Each callback function implements the core functionality for rendering a particular social
plugin. Its main task is to retrieve the appropriate private social data from the DataStore,
request any missing public data from the SNS (without revealing any user-identifying in-
formation), and compile the two into the personalized content that will be displayed. The
function then updates the DOM of the web page through the page reference that was passed
by the Request Handler.
DataStore The DataStore keeps locally all the private social data that might be required
for rendering personalized versions of any of the supported social plugins. All information
is organized in a SQLite database that is stored in the browser’s profile folder for the user
that has installed SafeButton. Upon first invocation, SafeButton begins the process of
prefetching the necessary data. This process takes place in the background, and relies on
the detection of browser idle time and event scheduling to operate opportunistically without
interfering with the user’s browsing activity.
In our implementation for Facebook, data retrieval begins with information about the
user’s friends, including each friend’s name, thumbnail picture, and unique identifier in
Facebook’s social graph. Then, for each friend, SafeButton retrieves events of social activity
such as the pages that a friend has liked or shared, starting with the oldest available event
and moving onward. In case the download process is interrupted, e.g., if the users turns off
the computer, it continues from where it left off the next time the browser is started.
Updating the DataStore is an incremental process that takes place periodically. Fortu-
nately, the current version of the Graph API offers support for incremental updates. As we
need to query for any new activity using a separate request for each friend (a Graph API
function for multiple user updates would be welcome), we do so gracefully for each friend
every two hours, or, if the browser is not idle, in the next idle period. We have empirically
found the above interval to strike a good balance between the timeliness of the locally stored
information and the incurred network overhead. In our future work, we plan to employ a
more elaborate approach based on an adaptive update interval with exponential backoff
so that a separate adaptive update interval can be maintained for different friend groups
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according to the frequency of their updates.
Note that we also need to address the consistency of the locally stored data with the
corresponding data that is available online. For instance, friends may “like” a page and later
on “unlike” it, thereby deleting this activity from their profile. Unfortunately, the Graph
API currently does not offer support for retrieving any kind of removal events. Nevertheless,
SafeButton periodically fetches the entire set of activities for each friend (at a much slower
pace than the incremental updates), and removes any stale entries from the DataStore.
X-Cache The X-Cache holds frequently used public information and meta-information,
such as the total number of “likes” for a page or the mapping between page URLs and
objects in the Facebook graph. A hit in the X-Cache means that no request towards
the social networking service is necessary for rendering a social plugin. This improves
significantly the time it takes for the rendering process to complete, and at the same time
does not reveal the IP address of the user to the SNS.
Use Case: Facebook Like Button Here we enrich the running case of the Facebook
Like button from Sec. 3.2 with the technical details of the behavior of SafeButton’s compo-
nents, as shown by the relevant steps in Fig. 3.2.
Upon visiting a web page with an embedded Like button in the form of an iframe, the
browser will issue an HTTP request towards Facebook to load and subsequently render
the contents of that iframe. The Request Handler intercepts this request and attempts to
match its URL against the set of signatures of the supported social plugins, which will trig-
ger a match for the regular expression http[s]?:\/\/www\.facebook\.com\/plugins\/
like\.php. Subsequently, the handler invokes the callback associated with this signature
and passes as an argument the plugin’s URL and a reference to the DOM of the page that
contains the social plugin (step 1).
The first action of the callback function is to query X-Cache for any cached non-
personalized information about the button and the page it is referring to. This includes
the mapping between the page’s URL and its ID in the Facebook graph, along with the
global count of users who have “liked” the page (step 3a). In case of a miss, a request made
through the Graph API retrieves that information (step 3b). The request is stripped from
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any Facebook cookies that the browser unavoidably appends to it. The response is then
added to X-Cache for future reference. After retrieving the global count of users, the names
(and if the developer has chosen so, the thumbnail pictures) of the user’s friends that have
liked the page are retrieved from the LocalStore (step 4).
Finally, the reference to the DOM of the embedding page (passed by the handler in
step 1), is used to update the iframe where the original Like button would have been with
exactly the same content (step 5).
3.4 Experimental Evaluation
3.4.1 Supported Facebook Plugins
In this section we discuss the social plugins offered by Facebook and evaluate the extend
to which SafeButton can support them in respect to two requirements: i) user privacy, and
ii) support for personalized content. Table 3.1 lists the nine social plugins currently offered
by Facebook. For each plugin, we provide a brief categorization of its “view” functionality,
i.e., the content presented to the user according to whether it is based on public (non-
personalized) or private (personalized) information, as well as its “on-click” functionality,
i.e., the type of action that a user can take.
Although SafeButton interferes with the “view” functionality of existing social plugins,
it does not affect their “on-click” functionality, allowing users to interact normally as with
the original plugins. As shown in Table 3.2, SafeButton currently provides complete support
for seven out of the nine social plugins currently offered by Facebook.
The Like button and its variation, the Like Box, are fully functional; the count, names,
and pictures of the user’s friends are retrieved from the DataStore, while the total number
of “likes” is requested on demand anonymously. The Recommendations plugin presents a
list of recommendations for pages from the same site, with those made by friends appearing
first. Recommendations from the user’s friends are stored locally, so SafeButton can render
those that are relevant to the visited site on top. The list is then completed with public
recommendations by others, which are retrieved on demand. Similarly to the Like button,





































Facebook Public Personalized User
Social Plugin Content Content Action 2012 2017
Like Button Total number of people that have liked the
page
Names and pictures of friends that
have liked the page
Like page 3 3
Send Button - - Send content/page URL 3 3
Comments List of user comments Friends’ comments appear on top Post comment 3 3
Activity Feed List of user activities (likes, comments,
shared pages)
Friends’ activities appear on top - 3 7
Recommendations List of user recommendations (likes) Friends’ recommendations appear on
top
- 3 7
Like Box Total number of people that have liked the
Facebook Page, names and pictures of
some of them, list of recent posts from the
Page
Names and pictures of friends that
have liked the page are shown first
Like page 3 7
Registration - User’s name, picture, birthday, gender,
location, email (prefilled in registration
form)
Register 3 7
Facepile - Names and pictures of friends that
have liked the page
- 3 7
Live Stream User messages - Post message 3 7
Embedded content Embed public posts, videos, etc. from
Facebook in other websites
- - 7 3
Follow Button Total number of people that are following
that person
Names and pictures of friends that are
following that person
Subscribe to public updates 7 3
Quote - - Select text on the website and share it
on Facebook
7 3
Save - - Save an external link in Facebook 7 3
Send - - Send an external link to a friend in
Facebook
7 3
Share - - Post an external link and its preview on
a friend’s profile in Facebook
7 3
Table 3.1: Public vs. Personalized content in Facebook’s social plugins [19].
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Exposed information Personalized
Facebook during loading Content with
Social Plugin Original SafeButton SafeButton
Like Button IP addr. + cookies IP addr. Complete
Send Button IP addr. + cookies None Complete
Comments IP addr. + cookies IP addr. Partial1
Activity Feed IP addr. + cookies IP addr. Partial2
Recommendations IP addr. + cookies IP addr. Complete
Like Box IP addr. + cookies IP addr. Complete
Registration IP addr. + cookies None Complete
Facepile IP addr. + cookies IP addr. Complete
Live Stream IP addr. + cookies IP addr. Complete
1 When all comments are loaded at once, all personalized content is
complete. In case they are loaded in a paginated form, some of the
friends’ comments (if any) might not be shown in the first page.
2 Some of the friends’ comments (if any) might be omitted (access to
comments is currently not supported by Facebook’s APIs).
Table 3.2: For 7 out of the 9 Facebook social plugins, SafeButton provides exactly the same
personalized content without exposing any user-identifying information.
present in the DataStore. The Send, Register, and Login buttons do not present any kind
of dynamic information, and thus can be rendered instantly without issuing any network
request.
Similarly to the Recommendations plugin, content personalization in the Comments
plugin consists of giving priority to comments made by friends. SafeButton retrieves the
non-personalized version of the plugin, and reorders the received comments so that friends’
comments are placed on top. When all comments for a page are fetched at once, the per-
sonalized information presented by SafeButton is fully consistent with the original version
of the plugin. However, when comments are presented in a paginated form, only the first
sub-page is loaded. The current version of the Graph API does not support the retrieval of
comments (e.g., in contrast to “likes”), and thus in case friends’ comments appear deeper
than the first sub-page, SafeButton will not show them on top (a workaround would be to
download all subsequent comment sub-pages, but for popular pages this would result in a
prohibitive amount of data).
The Activity Feed plugin is essentially a wrapper for showing a mix of “likes” and
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comments by friends, and thus again SafeButton’s output lacks any friends’ comments.
Note that our implementation is based solely on the functionality provided by the Graph
API [17], and we refrain from scraping web content for any missing information. Ideally,
future extensions of the Graph API will allow SafeButton to fully support the personalized
content of all plugins. We discuss this and other missing functionality that would facilitate
SafeButton in Sec. 3.6.
In recent years Facebook has retired plugins such as the Activity Feed and added new
ones all of which can be fully supported by SafeButton as they are aligned with the existing
plugins in the way they operate and the data they utilize to do so. For example the Follow
button is another iteration of the Like button. The majority of the new plugins operate
on public non-personalized content that is either presented to the user or is brought into
the social network following some user action such as sharing the content. Retrieving
non-personalized content without revealing the user’s identity to Facebook is supported
by SafeButton with the caveat of revealing the user’s IP address. As discussed in Section
3.6 additional privacy mechanisms to anonymize the IP address can be combined with
SafeButton.
3.4.2 Space Requirements
To explore the local space requirements of SafeButton, we gathered a data set that simulates
the friends a user may have. Starting with a set of friends from the authors’ Facebook
profiles, we crawled the social graph and identified about 300,000 profiles with relaxed
privacy settings that allow unrestricted access to all profile information, including the pages
that person has liked or shared in the past. From these profiles, we randomly selected a set
of 5,000—the maximum number of friends a person can have on Facebook [14].
To quantify the space needed for storing the required data from a user’s social circle,
we initialized SafeButton using the above 5,000 profiles. In detail, SafeButton prefetches
the names, IDs, and photos of all friends, and the URLs of all pages they have liked or
shared. Although we have employed a slow-paced data retrieval process (5sec delay between
consecutive requests), the entire process for all 5,000 friends took less than 10 hours. For
typical users with a few hundred friends, bootstrapping completes in less than a hour. As
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Data 190 Friends 5,000 Friends
Names, IDs of Friends 10.5KB 204.8KB
Photos of Friends 463.4KB 11.8MB
Likes of Friends 4.6MB 126.7MB
Shares of Friends 318.4KB 7.0MB
Total 5.4MB 145.7MB
Average (per friend) 29.2KB 29.7KB
Table 3.3: Storage space requirements for the average case of 190 friends and the edge case
of 5,000 friends.
already mentioned, users are free to use the browser during that time or shut it down and
resume the process later.
Table 3.3 shows a breakdown of the consumed space for the average case of a user with
190 friends [103] and the extreme case of a user with 5,000 friends, which totals 5.4MB and
145.7MB, respectively. Evidently, consumed space is dominated by “likes,” an observation
consistent with the prevailing popularity of the Like button compared to the other social
plugins. To gain a better understanding of storage requirements for different users, Fig. 3.3
shows the consumed space as a function of the number of friends, which as expected increases
linearly.
We should note that the above results are specific for the particular data set, and the
storage space might increase for users with more “verbose” friends. Furthermore, the profile
history of current members will only continue to grow as time passes by, and the storage
space for older users in the future will probably be larger. Nevertheless, these results
are indicative for the overall magnitude of SafeButton’s storage requirements, which can
be considered reasonable even for current smartphones, while the storage space of future
devices can only be expected to increase.
To further investigate the distribution of “likes,” the factor that dominates local space,
we plot in Fig. 3.4 the CDF of the number of “likes” of each user in our data set. The
median user has 122 “likes,” while there are some users with much heavier interaction: about
10% of the users have more than 504 “likes.” The total number of “likes” was 1,110,000,
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Figure 3.3: Local space consumption for the required information from a user’s social circle
as a function of the number of friends. For the average case of a user with 190 friends,
SafeButton needs just 5.4MB.
i.e., 222 per user on average. This number falls within the same order of magnitude as
previously reported statistics, which suggest that there are about 381,861 “likes” per minute
on Facebook [48]. With a total population of about 901 million active users [16] at the
time of the original measurement in 2012, this results in about 217 “likes” per user per
year. These results indicate that our data set is not particularly biased towards excessively
active or inactive profiles. We repeat the experiment in 2017 for a random population of
users using the authors’ profile as a starting point. Because of the high churn of online
social connections as well as people deactivating their profiles there is little overlap with the
population tested in 2012. Even though the two data sets cannot be compared directly data
shows that the use of social plugins and consequently SafeButton’s storage requirements
remain similar.
Besides the storage of social data, SafeButton maintains the X-Cache for quick access
to frequently used non-personalized data about a social plugin. To get an estimate about
its size requirements, we visited the home pages of the top 1,000 websites according to
alexa.com that contained at least one Facebook social plugin. About 82.4% of the identified
plugins corresponded to a Like Button or Like Box, 14% to Facebook Connect, 3% to
Recommendations, 0.5% to Send Button, and 0.1% to Facepile and Activity Box. After
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Figure 3.4: CDF of the number of “likes” of each user.
visiting all above sites, X-Cache grew to no more than 850KB, for more than 2,500 entries.
3.4.3 Speed
In this experiment, we explore the rendering time of social plugins with and without
SafeButton. Specifically, we measured the time from the moment the HTTP request for
loading the iframe of a Like button is sent by the browser, until its content is fully ren-
dered in the browser window. To do so, we instrumented Firefox with measurement code
triggered by http-on-modify-request notifications [28] and pageshow events [29]. We
chose to measure the rendering time for the iframe instead of the entire page to eliminate
measurement variations due to other remote elements in the page. This is consistent with
the way a browser renders a page, since iframes are loaded in parallel with the rest of its
elements.
We consider the following three scenarios: i) Firefox rendering a Like button unob-
structed, and Firefox with SafeButton rendering a Like button when there is ii) an X-Cache
miss or iii) an X-Cache hit. For the original Like button, we used a hot browser cache to
cancel out loading times for any required external elements, such as CSS and JavaScipt files.
Using SafeButton, visiting a newly or infrequently accessed web page will result in a miss
in the X-Cache. For a Like button, this means that besides looking up the relevant infor-
mation in the local DataStore, SafeButton must (anonymously) query Facebook to retrieve
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the total number of “likes.” For frequently accessed pages, such personalized information
will likely already exist in the X-Cache, and thus SafeButton does not place any network
request at all.
Using a set of the first 100 among the top websites according to alexa.com that contain
a Like button, we measured the loading time of the Like button’s iframe for each site (each
measurement was repeated 1,000 times). Figure 3.5 shows the median loading time across
all sites for each scenario, as well as its breakdown according to the events that take place
during loading. The rendering time for the original Like button is 351ms, most of which is
spent for communication with Facebook. In particular, it takes 130ms from the moment the
browser issues the request for the iframe until the first byte of the response is received, and
another 204ms for the completion of the transfer. In contrast, SafeButton is much faster,
as it needs 127ms for rendering the Like button in case of an X-Cache miss (2.8 times faster
than the original), and just 24ms in case of an X-Cache hit (14.6 times faster), due to the
absence of any network communication.
The difference in the response times for the network requests placed by the original Like
button and SafeButton in case of an X-Cache miss can be attributed to the different API
used and amount of data returned in each case. SafeButton uses the Graph API to retrieve
just the total number of “likes,” which is returned as a raw ASCII value that is just a few
bytes long. In contrast, the original plugin communicates with a different endpoint from
the side of Facebook, and fetches a full HTML page with embedded CSS and JavaScript
content. While these two requests need a similar amount of time from the moment they
are placed until the first response byte is received from the server, they differ by two orders
of magnitude in terms of the time required to complete the transfer. Even if Facebook
optimizes its own plugins in the future, we expect the rendering speed of SafeButton to be
comparable in case of an X-Cache miss, and still much faster in case of an X-Cache hit.
3.4.4 Effectiveness
As presented in Sec. 3.2, we rely on a set of heuristics that match the target URL of
each supported social plugin to intercept and treat them accordingly so as to protect the
user’s privacy. To evaluate the effectiveness and accuracy of our approach, we carried out
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Figure 3.5: Loading time for a Like button with and without SafeButton. Even when the
total number of “likes” is not available in the X-Cache, SafeButton is 2.8 times faster.
the following experiment. Using tcpdump, we captured a network trace of all outgoing
communication of a test PC in our lab while surfing the web for a week through Firefox
equipped with SafeButton. We then inspected the trace and found that no cookie was ever
transmitted in any HTTP communication with facebook.com or any of its sub-domains.
This was a result of the following “fail-safe” approach. Besides the signatures of the sup-
ported social plugins, SafeButton inspects all communication with facebook.com and strips
any cookies from requests initiated by third-party pages. Next, we performed the reverse
experiment: using the same browser equipped with SafeButton, we surfed www.facebook.com
and interacted with the site’s functionality without any issues for a long period. Careful
inspection of the log generated by SafeButton proved that no in-Facebook communication
was hindered at any time.
3.4.5 Revisiting Social Plugins
We revisit social plugins in 2017 and find that both their nature and types of information
stored in a user’s social graph remain unchanged. The most prevalent data type is a
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numeric graph ID pointing to other objects. Objects can be simple items such as URLs or
complex, such as user profiles, pointing to other objects. From the perspective of content
personalization SafeButton still needs to store numeric IDs and URLs. We find that our
storage requirements haven’t changed.
While one might expect that the user population is 2017 has significantly greater storage
needs because of additional data in their social profiles, from the perspective of personalizing
external content this might be explained by Facebook’s shift in strategy to bring content
into Facebook rather than letting users interact with it on other websites. Indicative of
this strategy is the fact that in the Facebook developer’s page the Share button, which
creates a copy of external content in Facebook, is now listed first, above the Like button.
Further evidence to support this trend is the deprecation of plugins that exposed social
data to external websites and the introduction of plugins that expose non-personalized data
or bring external data into the social network. We argue that even though Facebook is
steering users towards an in-network social experience SafeButton continues to benefit user
privacy because Facebook in the last few years has openly discussed using social plugins
as a way to profile users. In other words, even though it hasn’t extended the personalized
functionality of plugins it is increasingly depending on their presence to learn the browsing
history of its users.
3.5 Privacy-Preserving Social Plugins as a Service: A Pure
JavaScript Design
As many users are typically not aware of the privacy issues of social plugins, they are not
likely to install any browser extension for their protection. For instance, NoScript [36], a
Firefox add-on which blocks untrusted JavaScript code from being executed, has roughly
just 2 million users based on 2017 data, and AdBlock [2], an add-on which prevents adver-
tisement domains from loading as third parties in a web page, has about 14 million users.
At the same time, Firefox has 500 million active users [34], which brings the adoption rate
of the above security add-ons to 0.4% and 2.8%, respectively. For this reason, in this section
we present a pure JavaScript implementation of privacy-preserving social plugins that could




















Figure 3.6: Privacy-preserving social plugins serviced by a SNS. Here: the loading of a
social plugin in a third-party page. The code of the social plugin agent is always fetched
from a secondary domain to avoid leaking cookies set by the primary domain of the SNS.
The URL of the target page is passed via a fragment identifier so it is never transmitted to
the SNS. The agent synthesizes and renders the personalized content of the social plugin.
be employed by social networking services themselves for the protection of their members.
This design requires adoption and thus cooperation from social networks. By design, the
same origin policy prevents unintended communication across domains. While a JavaScript
implementation that can be hosted by websites embedding social plugins would obviate the
need for users to manually install SafeButton, Facebook and other social networks will need
to extend support so that it aligns with the same origin policy.
SafeButton has been motivated by the privacy concerns around the current implemen-
tation of social plugins. In 2010 Facebook claimed [38] that despite the leakage of browsing
history it was not using plugins for tracking. The following proposal assumes an honest
and not curious social network as Facebook claimed to be. Facebook has since reversed [13]

























Figure 3.7: Privacy-preserving social plugins serviced by a SNS. Here: securely communi-
cating the user’s session identifier to the social plugin agent when logging into the SNS.
Although the agent is hosted on a secondary domain, it receives and stores the identifier
from the primary domain through the postMessage API, allowing it to place asynchronous
authenticated requests for accessing the user’s profile information.
its statements but still claims that users will be able to opt out from tracking. Our pro-
posal still remains relevant as proof that privacy-preserving social plugins can be adopted
by websites without the need for browser add-ons. In theory Facebook could offer our
privacy-preserving version to users who opt out under their latest policy.
The use case would not be much different from now: web developers would still embed
an iframe element that loads the social plugin from the SNS. However, instead of serving
a traditional social plugin, the SNS serves a JavaScript implementation of a social plugin
agent in respect to the design presented in Sec. 3.2. The agent then fetches personalized in-
formation from the browser’s local storage, requests non-personalized information from the
SNS, and renders the synthesized content according to the specified social plugin. The feasi-
bility of the above design is supported by existing web technologies such as IndexedDB [26],
which provide a JavaScript API for managing a local database, similar to the DataStore
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used in SafeButton.
The most challenging aspect of this implementation is to prevent the leakage of user-
identifying information during the loading of a social plugin. If the iframe of the social plugin
agent is hosted on the same (sub)domain as the SNS itself (e.g., socialnetwork.com), then
the request for fetching its JavaScript code would also transmit the user’s cookies for the
SNS. At the same time, the agent would need to know the URL of the embedding page to
personalize the social plugin’s content. If the URL is passed as a parameter to that initial
request, the situation is obviously as problematic as in current social plugins.
A solution would be to leave out the URL of the page from the request for loading the
social plugin agent. However, there should be a way to communicate this information to
the agent once its JavaScript code has been loaded by the browser. This can be achieved
through a fragment identifier [52] in the URL from which the agent is loaded. Fragment
identifiers come as the last part of a URL, and begin with a hash mark (#) character.
According to the HTTP specification [24], fragment identifiers are never transmitted as
part of a request to a server. Thus, during the loading of a social plugin in a third-party
page, instead of passing an explicit parameter with the URL of the embedding page, as in
www.socialnetwork.com/sp-agent.js?url=<URL>, it can be passed through a fragment identifier,
as in www.socialnetwork.com/sp-agent.js#<URL>. The information about the URL of the visited
page never leaves the browser, and remains accessible to the JavaScript code of the agent,
which can then parse the hypertext reference of its container and extract the fragment
identifier.
Unfortunately, this approach is still not secure in practice. The URL of the embedding
page is usually also transmitted as part of the HTTP Referer [sic] header by most browsers.
Therefore, even if we omit the target URL from the HTTP parameters of the request, the
server will receive it anyway, allowing the SNS to correlate this information with the user’s
cookies that are transmitted as part of the same request.
To overcome this issue, the social plugin agent can be hosted on a secondary domain,
different than the primary domain of the SNS, as also proposed by Do Not Track [7]. For
instance, in this design the agent could be hosted under socialnetwork-cdn.net instead of
socialnetwork.com, as shown in Fig. 3.6. This prevents the browser from appending the
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user’s cookies whenever a social plugin is encountered (step 2), since its iframe will be
served from a different domain than the one for which the cookies were set. The rest of the
steps are analogous to Fig. 3.1.
Still, the social plugin agent must be able to issue authenticated requests towards the
SNS for accessing the user’s profile and retrieving the necessary private social information
that must be maintained locally. This requires access to the user’s cookies, and specifically
to the identifier of the authenticated session that the user has with the SNS.
This challenge can be addressed through the window.postMessage() [30] JavaScript
API which allows two different origins to communicate. When the user logs in on the SNS,
the login page contains a hidden iframe loaded through HTTPS from the secondary domain
on which the social plugin agent is hosted, as shown in Fig. 3.7 (step 2). The login page then
communicates to the agent’s iframe the session identifier of the user through postMessage
(step 3). The iframe executes JavaScript code that stores locally the user identifier under its
own domain, making it accessible to the plugin agent. The agent can then read the session
identifier from its own local storage, and place authenticated requests towards the SNS for
accessing the user’s profile (step 4) and synchronizing the required information with the
locally stored data. When the user explicitly logs out from the social networking site, the
log out page follows a similar process to erase the identifier from the local storage of the
agent.
In respect to supporting multiple users per browser instance and protecting the personal
information stored locally, encryption can be employed to shield any sensitive information,
such as the names or identifiers of a user’s friends. In accordance with the communication
of the session identifier described above, a user-specific cryptographic key can be communi-
cated from the SNS to the social plugin agent. The plugin can then use this key to encrypt
sensitive information locally. The key is kept only in memory. Each time the plugin agent
loads, it spawns a child iframe towards the social networking site. The request for the child
iframe will normally have the user’s cookies appended. Finally, that child iframe, once
loaded, can communicate via postMessage the encryption key back to the plugin agent.
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3.6 Discussion
Strict Mode of Operation Although SafeButton does not send any cookies to the social
networking service, it still needs to make non-authenticated requests towards the SNS to
fetch public information for some social plugins (e.g., for Facebook plugins, the information
shown in column “Public Content” in Table 3.1). These requests unavoidably expose the
user’s IP address to the SNS.
Some users might not feel comfortable with exposing their IP address to the SNS (even
when no cookies are sent), as this information could be correlated by the SNS with other
sources of information, and could eventually lead to the exposure of the users’ true iden-
tity. For such privacy-savvy users, we consider a “paranoid” mode of operation in which
SafeButton does not reveal the user’s IP address to the social networking service when
encountering a social plugin in a third-party page, by simply not retrieving any public in-
formation about the page. Unavoidably, some social plugins are then rendered using solely
the locally available personalized information, e.g., for the Like button, the total number
of “likes” for the page will be missing.
Alternatively, given the very low traffic incurred by SafeButton’s non-authenticated
queries to the SNS, these can be carried out transparently by SafeButton through an anony-
mous communication network such as Tor [63]. Given that social plugins are loaded in
parallel with the rest of the page’s elements, this would minimally affect the browsing ex-
perience (compared to browsing solely through Tor). Moreover, as users would first need to
consume the page’s content before attempting to use a social plugin they might not notice
any delay in its rendering. We defer the evaluation of SafeButton utilizing Tor to the future.
Potential Challenges with Future Social Plugins. Although SafeButton currently
supports all social plugins offered by Facebook, and our approach is extensible so as to
handle the plugins of other social networking services, we consider two potential challenges
with future plugins [78]. First, future personalization functionality could include social
information from a user’s second degree friends, i.e., the friends of his friends, or rely on the
analysis of data from the entire user population of the social network. Second, this type of
personalization could involve proprietary algorithms not available to the client at run-time.
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Fundamentally SafeButton supports social plugins that leverage the intersection of user
data with website content to enable personalized interaction with the website. We consider
user data to be provided by the user to the social network or available to them. Examples of
the latter is content uploaded by their friends that the user can access through their social
profile. Future plugins that follow this data model will be supported by SafeButton. Even if
future plugins rely on processing using proprietary algorithms or benefit from extended data
sets they may do so offline while storing an intermediate or final product for real-time use
by social plugins. In that case, as long as that product is part of the user’s data SafeButton
will be able to utilize it to support those plugins. We acknowledge that supporting future
social plugins of a different nature than the above model is an open challenge and part of
future work around SafeButton and privacy-preserving social plugins in general.
Profile Management As users may access the web via more than one devices, it rea-
sonable to assume that they will require a practical way to use SafeButton in all of them.
Although installing SafeButton on each browser should be enough, this will result in the
synchronization of the locally stored information with the SNS for each instance separately.
In our future work we will consider the use of cloud storage for keeping fully-encrypted
copies of the local DataStore and X-Cache, and synchronizing them across all the user’s
browser instances in the same spirit as existing settings and bookmark synchronization
features of popular browsers [22,42].
Keeping a local copy of private information that is normally accessible only through the
social networking service might be considered a security risk as it would be made readily
available to an attacker that gains unauthorized access to the user’s system. At that point
though the attacker would already have access to the user’s credentials (or could steal them
by installing a keylogger on the compromised host) and could easily gather this information
from the SNS anyway.
In any case, users could opt-in for keeping the DataStore encrypted, although this would
require them to provide a password to SafeButton (similarly to the above mentioned settings
synchronization features). For the pure JavaScript implementation though, as discussed in
Section 3.5, the cryptographic key can be supplied by the SNS upon user login, making the
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process completely transparent to the user.
Security in Multi-user Environments We now consider the operation of SafeButton
in a multi-user environment where more than one users share the same browser instance. In
general, sharing the same browser instance is a bad security practice, because after users are
done with a browsing session they may leave sensitive information behind, such as stored
passwords, cookies, and browsing history. Ideally, users should maintain their own browser
instance or accounts in the operating system.
SafeButton retrieves private information when users are logged in the SNS, and stores
it locally even after they log out, as it would be inefficient to erase it every single time.
Multiple users are supported by monitoring the current cookies for that domain of the
SNS, and serving personalized content only for the user that is currently logged in. Local
entries that belong to a user ID that does not match the one currently logged in are never
returned. Obviously, users that share the same OS account can access each other’s locally
stored data, since they are contained in the same DataStore instance, unless they have
opted in for keeping their data encrypted, as discussed earlier.
Shortcomings of the Graph API We have briefly mentioned some obstacles we have
encountered, namely shortcomings in the developer API provided by Facebook, in respect
to our objective of protecting the user’s privacy while maintaining full functionality for
the social plugins. We summarize these issues here and discuss how the social networks in
general could support us.
User Activity Updates through the API. Currently the Facebook API [17] offers access to
the social graph but there is no way to receive updates or “diffs” when something changes.
For instance, we retrieve a friend’s “likes” through the API, we are also able to fetch only new
“likes” from a point forward, but are unable to receive notice when that friend “unlikes.” A
friend “activity” or “history” function could significantly aid our implementation in keeping
an accurate local store.
Accuracy of the Provided Information. Sometimes, the API calls and documentation
offered to developers differ slightly from the actual behavior of a plugin when it is offered
by the SNS itself [18]. This creates a predicament for developers wishing to replicate the
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functionality.
Support for All Social Information that is Otherwise Accessible. We consider it reason-
able for the API to provide access to information that is accessible via the social plugins
offered by the SNS itself or via the profile pages of its users. For instance, there is no API
call to access the comments of a specific user, although they appear in the user’s profile
page. Scrapping could retrieve them, but this practice is not ideal. Therefore, in our case,
we have to resort to practices that result in reduced accuracy, such as anonymously retriev-
ing a sample of the comments of a page and placing the comments of a user’s friends at the
top, if present in the sample. Retrieving the entire set of comments could be inefficient for
pages with too many comments.
Alternatively, if Facebook did offer a more elaborate API around comment retrieval we
could fetch the user IDs of all the commenters and subsequently specify a set of IDs to
retrieve comments for. In that way we could hide the IDs of a user’s friends among a group
of k strangers and request their comments for that page [101].




We present an architecture called Topology-aware Network Tunnels (TNT) which reduces
insecure network paths to Internet services without their participation. An insecure path
is a set of links over the Internet carrying traffic vulnerable to a network adversary. We
use unencrypted and unauthenticated protocols such as HTTP or SMTP as our use case.
Shorter insecure paths limit the exposure of the vulnerable, e.g., plain-text, traffic to passive
and active network adversaries. At a high level, TNT establishes a network overlay of secure
tunnels between the client and a set of vantage points. TNT evaluates the network path from
each vantage point towards each packet’s destination. It then selects the tunnel minimizing
exposure to adversaries.
The TNT architecture addresses two key challenges: (1) optimize the placement of
secure tunnels across the Internet and (2) determine the optimal tunnel to route each
network packet through.
4.2 Threat Model
In our threat model the adversary can both passively monitor and actively alter network
traffic at some point between a client and a server. This includes end-user ISPs as well as
Internet backbone operators. Backbone networks, especially Tier 1 providers, are able to
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Figure 4.1: In the TNT architecture an overlay of secure topology-aware tunnels is estab-
lished between the client and a set of network vantage points. The number and placement
of secure tunnels is strategically selected to minimize the network distance packets need to
travel outside the overlay to reach their destination. Individual network packets are intel-
ligently routed through the tunnel exiting closest to their destination. Tunnel exits within
the same network as the destination of a packet (Servers A, B) eliminate the exposure of
traffic to network adversaries.
eavesdrop and tamper with traffic from multiple ISPs as it passes through.
Clients on a public network, e.g., WiFi hotspot, run TNT locally on their system.
Alternatively, in a trusted private network such as a residential setup TNT can run on the
home router. We also consider the networks hosting Internet services as trusted. Hosting
providers have a clear incentive to keep their network secure from external threats and
honor their agreement with customers. These threats include individuals or organizations
passively eavesdropping on or actively manipulating traffic. Cloud networks where customer
traffic may travel between data centers are assumed to secure their links. As a matter of
fact Google has responded to evidence that intelligence agencies were eavesdropping [46] on
its data centers by encrypting [37] the connections between them. Microsoft [43] has done
the same. An adversary able to gain access to the trusted networks or systems of the client
or the server is out of scope.
TNT creates encrypted tunnels between a client and key networks where Internet ser-
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Figure 4.2: Example of a network path on the Internet. For insecure protocols, such as
HTTP, data is exposed across the path to operators of the underlying infrastructure.
vices form clusters, namely in the cloud. As a result, adversaries not able to compromise the
services or their hosting providers are presented with encrypted and authenticated traffic as
opposed to plain text. This includes end-user ISPs and Internet backbone operators which
are presently a threat because of their position in the network. It might seem that TNT
exits create appealing targets where Internet traffic is funneled through a few networks.
However, an adversary able to monitor tunnel exits is already able to monitor the networks
hosting the servers and gains no advantage by the presence of TNT.
4.3 Design
4.3.1 Topology-Aware Network Overlay
The key intuition behind our proposal is that Internet services are clustered in few cloud and
other infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) providers. Therefore we can optimize the number
and placement of secure tunnels by collocating them with these infrastructure providers.
This addresses the first challenge from above. That way we can shorten the insecure network
path and essentially bring the client as close to these servers as possible, ideally within the
same network. As a result, the traffic of insecure protocols will have minimal or zero
exposure on the Internet. Apart from minimizing the overall path length, we also define
metrics rewarding or penalizing the presence of a trusted or untrusted intermediate network
in the path. The trustworthiness of a network is context specific so we focus on path length.
Figure 4.2 presents an example of a network path today. The set of links and routers a
client’s packets must traverse to reach a server is grouped into autonomous systems (ASes)
and controlled by distinct organizations. Note that such path might span different countries
or continents. This translates to potential passive and active attacks against the user’s web
browsing or e-mail.
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Figure 4.1 presents the TNT architecture as an overlay on the existing Internet infras-
tructure. TNT has established secure tunnels between the client and two cloud networks
that exhibit high clustering of Internet services. Server A is hosted by Cloud Provider 1
and we can reach it through Topology-aware Tunnel 1 without exposing plain-text traffic
to the Internet. Packets towards Server A enter the tunnel before leaving the user’s net-
work and are encrypted and signed. Internet routers operated by AS 1 and AS x observe
an encrypted flow from the user to Server A. Without TNT these ASes have access to
plain-text traffic. Packets exit the tunnel inside the trusted network of Cloud Provider
1 and are authenticated and decrypted. Subsequently packets transit the cloud provider’s
network and reach Server A which is unaware of the process. To reach Server C without
TNT the user’s packets will travel in plain text through AS 1, AS y and AS z. With a
TNT link to Cloud Provider 2 they travel encrypted and signed through AS 1 and AS y.
Server C is an outlier not hosted in a cluster of Internet services. In this case TNT is able
to minimize the length of the insecure network path so instead of 3 ASes only AS z will
be able to observe plain-text traffic. Next we describe how the TNT router determines the
optimal tunnel to route traffic through so as to minimize insecure network paths.
4.3.2 The TNT Router
The TNT router is a routing software suite managing topology-aware tunnels and directing
traffic through them. It is located on the client’s system or local network gateway, for
instance a home router, and maintains topology-aware tunnels with remote networks based
on the placement strategy described earlier. It has a network-mapping and a decision-
making component. Given the available tunnels and a specific destination address the
mapping component employs a set of probes to discover the network path between each
tunnel’s exit on the remote network and the destination. The discovery process involves
active and passive network measurements described in section 4.6. The information is
passed on to the decision-making component which evaluates it and assigns metrics on
each tunnel based on its suitability to carry traffic to the specific destination. Based on
the metric the TNT router directs outgoing traffic through the tunnel which minimizes its
value. This satisfies the second challenge from the beginning of this section. To account for
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TNT
Router
   
                 
Kernel IP routing table
Destination  Gateway      Genmask          M IF
0.0.0.0      192.168.0.1  0.0.0.0          0 eth0
192.168.0.0  0.0.0.0      255.255.255.0    0 eth0
a.b.c.d
Kernel IP routing table
Destination  Gateway      Genmask          M IF
0.0.0.0      10.0.0.1     0.0.0.0          0 tun0
a.m.z.n      192.168.0.1  255.255.255.255  0 eth0
a.z.u.r      192.168.0.1  255.255.255.255  0 eth0
192.168.0.0  0.0.0.0      255.255.255.0    0 eth0
10.0.0.1     0.0.0.0      255.255.255.255  0 tun0
10.0.1.1     0.0.0.0      255.255.255.255  0 tun1








   













Figure 4.3: Operation of the TNT router when serving client requests towards network
destination a.b.c.d. Initially it updates the system’s routing table (1) to route all network
packets through one of the tunnels by default (2). A client’s request for which there is no
explicit route will go through the default tunnel (3). Subsequently the TNT router will task
the probes at each tunnel’s exit with determining their distance from that destination so
that future requests can be better routed (4). Following the path announcements from the
probes, an explicit routing entry is created for that destination (5). The operating system
will use that entry for future client requests (6).
the dynamicity of Internet routing the TNT router periodically reevaluates these metrics.
4.4 Understanding the Landscape of Web Services
We are motivated by the limited presence of encrypted and authenticated communication
protocols on the Internet. We focus on HTTPS and 10,000 popular web services according
to Alexa. In 2015 we found that only 30% offer HTTP over TLS. In practice 15% redirect
to HTTPS. Just 4% of the sites have an HSTS policy that prevents an active network
attacker from downgrading clients to plain HTTP. Repeated measurements the following
years show an increase in services capable of HTTPS. With just half of popular web services
using HTTPS, under the most optimistic interpretation of the data, our motivation remains
relevant. Services available over TLS can also benefit from our proposal. As we are reducing
the networks traffic is exposed to, we can mitigate cases of insecure TLS implementations
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or leaking of the SNI [51] when that is a privacy concern. At the same time we observe that
popular web services are collocated in a small set of networks with 10 autonomous systems
hosting 66% of the traffic generated by a web browser when visiting the home page of 10,000
popular web servers. We argue that if clients can reach these few networks securely they are
able to connect to the hosted web services without exposing their plain-text HTTP traffic
to the Internet.
4.4.1 HTTPS Adoption
To quantify the extent to which HTTPS has been adopted by Internet sites we evaluated
10,000 popular web domains according to Alexa. We focused on the .com, .org and .net
top-level domains that resolved to US ASes. We verified the TLS certificates presented by
these domains using the certificate authorities trusted by Mozilla. Table 4.1 presents our
findings. Our HTTPS connection attempts were refused by 21.4% of the servers. Even
worse, 21.5% redirected our HTTPS requests to HTTP. Additionally, 22.1% of the servers
returned a TLS certificate which failed verification. Overall we failed to contact almost 70%
over HTTPS.
The few sites supporting both HTTP and HTTPS need to make sure their visitors
reach their secure endpoint. Search engine results and links from other sites might steer
users towards the insecure HTTP. Also, if users omit the https:// scheme when typing in
the address bar, their browser will default to the insecure http://. Unfortunately for the
majority of HTTPS-capable sites users will continue to visit them over HTTP. To make
matters worse, an active network attacker can prevent the redirection to HTTPS from
taking place by replacing https:// URLs with http:// in the server’s responses in flight.
Some ISPs are known to remove the STARTTLS string from SMTP responses, which serves
a similar purpose for e-mail. The use of the Strict-Transport-Security HTTP header
can mitigate this by instructing the user agent to place future requests exclusively over
HTTPS. We evaluated the use of HSTS among servers redirecting visitors to HTTPS and
found that only 25% return a valid policy. Overall out of 10,000 popular web servers we
find that only 3,207 (32.1%) support HTTPS and just 420 (4.2%) support HTTPS with an
HSTS policy. Note that just 56 domains are found in the hard-coded HSTS preload list of
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2015 2016 2017
HTTPS response HTTPS? % % %
1 Error (Conn. refused) No 21.4 19.8 16.0
2 Error (Invalid cert.) No 22.1 19.2 10.8
3 Error (HTTP 4xx 5xx) No 2.9 2.0 1.4
4 HTTPS downgraded No 21.5 22.1 16.7
Total No 67.9 63.1 44.9
5 OK Yes 17.0 16.6 15.1
6 OK (HTTP upgraded) Yes 10.9 15.0 29.9
7 OK (HSTS) Yes 4.2 5.3 10.1
Total Yes 32.1 36.9 55.1
Table 4.1: HTTPS capability of 10K popular domains. While the percentage of sites offer-
ing TLS has increased in recent years, users still access 45% of popular domains without
encryption. Moreover, with the majority of HTTPS domains lacking an HSTS policy, users
are vulnerable to TLS stripping attacks and may fall back to plain-text HTTP.
Chrome and Firefox.
Our most recent findings are consistent with a similar study [91] which highlights the
lack of encryption in the web when moving away from few popular sites such as search
engines and social networks. It also predicts that it will take more than 5 years for sites in
the long tail of the web to adopt HTTPS in their majority. Moreover, the evaluation [39] of
the TLS implementations of popular domains in 2017 found 13% to be inadequate. (Grade
F) SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, which are considered insecure implementations, were found in 15%
and 93% of domains respectively and a non-trivial number of domains were vulnerable to
to known attacks such as DROWN, POODLE, CRIME and protocol downgrade.
HTTP/2 [25] is the latest version of the HTTP protocol. While web browsers, such as
Chrome and Firefox, currently implement it only over TLS to motivate websites to adopt
encryption the RFC does not make that practice mandatory. On the contrary, HTTP/2
over cleartext TCP (h2c) is described as a possible implementation. Even if web vendors
refrain from supporting such an insecure option, HTTP/2 will not only have to become
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% Autonomous System Name




3.7 EdgeCast Networks, Inc.
2.9 SoftLayer Technologies Inc.
2.1 Fastly
1.7 Tinet SpA
1.6 Internap Network Services Corp.
1.5 Rackspace Hosting
65.8 Total
Table 4.2: Top 10 most frequent ASes hosting sites.
widely adopted but domains will need to deprecate HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1 currently
offered over unencrypted connections. Based on the deployment history of TLS, the need
to support older clients as well as the resources for updating the configuration of a web
service will likely make deprecating insecure HTTP a long process.
4.4.2 Web Service Collocation
To study the geography of Internet services we mapped the websites from our data set to
their respective ASes. A site may depend on more than one domain for resources such as
scripts and images so we used a web browser to fully render the home page of each domain
in our data set and recorded the destinations involved. We did not log HTTPS requests.
We consider the home page of a domain to be the content received when visiting the exact
domain or the standard www subdomain.
We visited the home pages of 9,944 domains from out data set. We excluded the 56
HTTPS-capable domains found in the HSTS preload list of Chrome. Ultimately we made
701,929 HTTP requests towards 34,893 unique domains to fully render the home pages. We
subsequently resolved the domain names to their respective IP addresses and mapped them
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to ASes based on BGP prefix announcements collected by APNIC. Table 4.2 presents the
top 10 most frequent ASes hosting the web servers involved in our 701,929 HTTP requests.
The top 10 most frequent ASes host servers that receive 65.8% of all HTTP requests made.
Web servers hosted by Google present an interesting case. 22% of the HTTP requests
made to Google servers target the google-analytics.com and 13% the doubleclick.net domain.
As evidence has shown [47] passive network adversaries colluding with Internet backbone
providers collect identifiers involved in requests to these domains to track users. It is
also interesting that to reach Google our requests had to travel through two different tier 1
Internet backbone providers. The requests were made from a residential ISP and a university
network in the US. In contrast, using our proposal (TNT) we can reach Google in a single
network hop without exposing traffic to backbone providers.
To summarize, web services are clustered in few networks owned by cloud and other
infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) providers. If end-to-end security with these services is not
available, the next best thing is for users to establish a secure link to these networks and
route traffic through it. Cloud providers make this approach practical as users can deploy
their own virtual machines in the same networks.
4.5 Implementation
We have implemented the TNT router as an IPv4 routing software suite and tested it
in Linux. An Internet-layer implementation is more flexible since it is transport and
application-layer agnostic. While the core of the router operates at the IP layer, peripheral
components implement high-level logic that enables traffic handling based on transport and
application-layer heuristics. By default the router focuses on HTTP (TCP port 80) and
SMTP (TCP port 25) traffic while all other traffic, including HTTPS, is routed as if TNT
is not in place. The TNT router presents its tunnels as network interfaces to the operating
system. The router determines the optimal tunnel to route outgoing traffic through and
communicates its decision to the operating system. It does so by interacting with the un-
derlying routing structures. Updating the operating systems routing structures affects how
IP packets are transmitted through the available network interfaces. The operating system
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ultimately writes outgoing packets to the appropriate interface.
The TNT router reacts to outgoing traffic but instead of preventing its transmission until
it makes a routing decision it applies its decision to future flows to the same destination.
This way it does not disrupt the user’s activity or impact network performance. While this
means that the first flow to a new destination is not routed optimally in section 4.6 we show
that the routing state quickly becomes optimal following the router’s initialization phase.
The routing state persists across system restarts.
Realizing the TNT router addresses the following challenges: (1) Be practical to de-
ploy, use and maintain. (2) Reliably discover the network topology between tunnel exits
and Internet destinations to make routing decisions. (3) Dynamically update the system’s
routing table without disrupting existing connections. Any naive routing update will reset
connection-oriented protocols such as TCP.
4.5.1 Deployment
We use OpenVPN to establish TLS-based tunnels with virtual machines in the cloud. Tun-
nels appear as network interfaces to the operating system with a standard 1500-byte MTU.
IP packets entering the tunnel are handled by OpenVPN which fragments them if necessary,
encrypts them, appends its signature and sends them to the other end of the tunnel which
reverses the steps. OpenVPN supports a variety of ciphersuites from OpenSSL. Our design
is not specific to a tunneling technology or ciphersuites.
The deployment of the TNT overlay is automated including installing the TNT router
locally and launching the necessary virtual machines in the cloud. We use a combination
of Unix shell scripts and the command-line interfaces offered by cloud providers. At the
moment we prompt the user for their cloud account credentials however we envisage a
deployment process without any user involvement. We do not depend on specific cloud
providers but deploying a virtual machine is a provider-specific process which we need
to implement. We launch Linux virtual machines in the cloud and configure OpenVPN
on both ends of each tunnel. Once the tunnels are established the deployment phase is
complete and the TNT router begins running on the user’s system without the need for
further interaction. Signing up for a new cloud account can be streamlined as part of the
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deployment script. Users do not share their virtual machines with others but they do share
the underlying physical hardware. Attacks from a collocated virtual instance are beyond
the scope of our threat model. Cloud operators could offer TNT links to their network as
a service so that users do not need their own virtual machines.
4.5.2 Operation
The TNT router has three components; (a) a TNT traffic selection program running on
the client, (b) the TNT routing daemon also running on the client and (c) probes running
on the remote end of each tunnel, which in our case are virtual machines in the cloud.
Figure 4.3 depicts the operation of TNT. Initially the TNT daemon brings up the tunnels
as distinct network interfaces. One of them at random is set to be the default interface
meaning that all traffic TNT is configured to handle goes through it. The system’s routing
table is updated from step 1 to 2 in the figure. Traffic TNT is not configured to handle gets
routed as if TNT is not in place, i.e., still gets routed based on step 1 in the figure. So far
all tunnels but the default remain unused by the operating system since it has no reason
to prefer them over the default. As a result the client’s initial requests to the Internet host
a.b.c.d will go over the default tunnel (step 3). Delaying outgoing traffic until the TNT
router calculates the metrics for a destination would impact performance. Setting up a
default TNT route instead protects traffic from end-user ISPs without the need to wait for
a routing decision. In section 4.6 we show that the router quickly makes an optimal decision
applied to subsequent flows.
The TNT traffic selection program inspects outgoing traffic for the purpose of identifying
destinations that the TNT router must handle. It uses libpcap and is able to identify traffic
flows. To select traffic it uses BPF expressions and by default focuses on outgoing TCP
flows to port 80 so as to select HTTP traffic. For each new flow matching the selection
filter it extracts the destination IP address and queries the TNT routing daemon for an
optimal route. If not found it tasks the forward probes with mapping their network path
to the destination (step 4). The forward probes subsequently communicate their findings
to the routing daemon directly. To facilitate the network measurements the traffic selection
program supplies not only the target IP address but additional context such as the transport
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protocol and destination port used. The forward probes listen on their end of the tunnel
interface for control commands. They use active network measurements to discover the
path to a destination on demand and announce it back to the router. We describe the
measurement methodology in section 4.6.
The routing daemon interacts with the other components in two ways; it looks up IP
addresses in the current routing table on behalf of the traffic selection program and evaluates
network path vectors received from the forward probes. The traffic selection program queries
the daemon with the IP addresses of destination in outgoing traffic flows. An IP address
found in the routing table associated with a metric value means the optimal tunnel to reach
that particular destination has been determined in the past. Otherwise the traffic selection
program receives a negative response. The forward probes, tasked with discovering their
network path to a destination, announce it back to the daemon. When evaluating the
network path from a particular tunnel exit the daemon calculates a metric value based
on the tunnel’s suitability to carry traffic to that destination. We focus on path length
as our metric and count the number of ASes involved. The daemon subsequently decides
to route traffic through the tunnel which minimizes the metric and updates the operating
system’s routing structures to direct packets for that destination through a particular tunnel
interface rather than the default. In Linux the daemon uses the Netlink1 interface to access
and alter the necessary operating system structures. In figure 4.3 the probes announce
paths with distance 2 and 1 respectively for a.b.c.d so a decision is made to route the
destination through tun1. Future requests for that host will go through tun1. This is
done with an explicit entry in the operating system’s routing table (step 5). Note that
the newly introduced route will only be applied to flows matching the context this route
was generated. So a route generated because of an outgoing TCP port 80 flow will only
be applied to flows to that port. Flows to 443 or some other port to the same destination
will not be affected. Applying a route only to specific transport or application-layer flows
is discussed later in this section.
The TNT router performs a series of optimizations to its routing table. To avoid stale
routing entries it implements a decaying system where entries that have not been used
1 http://lxr.linux.no/linux+v3.19/net/core/rtnetlink.c
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for routing recently are pruned from the routing table. Similarly, for frequently used des-
tinations it schedules lazy reassessments of the optimal path with exponential backoff to
stay current with Internet routing changes. TNT routing entries actually describe entire
AS prefixes rather than individual hosts. When the forward probes respond to a mapping
query for a particular destination host they lookup and return the related BPG prefix the
destination’s AS is responsible for. This eliminates additional queries for addresses in the
same prefix. Finally the router aggregates routes by grouping adjacent route prefixes to
form shorter prefixes and reduce the number of entries in the table.
4.5.3 Transparent Routing Updates
Updating the routing table of a live end-user system to essentially implement multihoming
is not a trivial task. Network routers dynamically change their routing table on a frequent
basis without the same challenge because they simply forward IP packets without altering
their header. However, packets exiting an interface in an end-user system adopt2 that
interface’s IP address as their source. A routing update directing packets of an existing
TCP connection through a different interface will change their source IP address. Packets
with the new source IP address will be dropped or met with packets with the RST flag
set since from the remote endpoint’s perspective do not match any existing connection.
Ultimately the TCP connection will close unexpectedly.
To ensure non-disruptive updates to the operating system’s routing table we implement
a transitioning process which guarantees the continuity of existing sessions in TCP as well
as UDP and ICMP logical sessions. We utilize the support for multiple routing tables in the
Linux kernel as well as the functionality offered by its Netfilter framework. The key idea is
to split a routing update into two phases. Initially a new route is taken into consideration
only for new connections while existing ones are routed as if the update never took place.
This guarantees continuity. Eventually connections predating the update will terminate
naturally and the system will reach a stable state where all connections use the updated
2 While there are ways around that, upstream providers usually implement egress filtering to block
outgoing packets with spoofed IP addresses. In TNT different tunnel interfaces are expected to exit in
disjoint network prefixes.
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Effective Routing Table
by Connection Status1
t TNT Event Routing State Existing2 New
0 Stable Main Main
1 Start Converging Main TNT0
2 Stable TNT0 TNT0
3 Update route X Converging TNT0 TNT1
4 Stable TNT1 TNT1
5 Terminate Converging TNT1 Main
6 Stable Main Main
1 Connection status is independent of the transport protocol used.
It is logical, applies to TCP as well as UDP and ICMP and is based
on timers and bi-directional IP packet exchange.
2 Existing connections are in a logically-assured state.
For TCP this is either the Related or Established state.
Table 4.3: Updating the operating system’s routing table so as not to disrupt existing TCP
connections. The TNT router transitions the system from the current table to an updated
version by cloning the table, modifying the new table and setting it as effective only for
new connections.
route and the old one is deleted.
To implement this two-phase routing we clone the currently effective routing table into a
new routing table and instruct the operating system to look up new connections in the new
table while keep reusing the old one for existing connections. Initially we clone the default,
main routing table into a new table TNT0. (Time t0 in Table 4.3) The system transitions
into a state where any already established TCP connections, as well as logically-assured
UDP and ICMP connections, keep using the main routing table whereas the destinations of
new connections are looked up in the TNT0 table. (t1) Eventually all connections predating
the update (t1) will naturally terminate and the system will reach a state where all current
and future connections will use table TNT0 exclusively. (t2) Subsequently any updates
after time t2 will clone TNT0 into TNT1, enter a converging state t3 and eventually reach
a stable state t4.
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If we need to update the effective routing table while the system is still converging from
a previous update we must allocate an additional table instead of recycling an existing one.
For example a new update during time t3 will cause the effective table TNT1 to be copied
to a new table TNT2 which will then be updated and marked as the effective table. We
cannot reuse table TNT0 at this time since it is still being used by connections predating the
last routing update. We try to carry out updates in batches to avoid the need for more than
two tables at a time. However traffic scenarios such as web browsing might cause bursts of
updates that do not fit in a single batch. Under reasonable conditions Linux does not limit3
us in the number of tables we can maintain. As soon as all connections associated with an
old routing table are terminated that table becomes eligible for reuse in a future routing
update. In section 4.6 we quantify the amount of routing tables necessary under realistic
network activity. A routing cache would eliminate the need for the above technique. Since
version 3.6 [84] the Linux kernel no longer supports such a cache for efficiency reasons.
Windows 7 implements a routing cache but the same reasons might justify its removal from
future versions.
To advise the operating system which routing table to use for each destination lookup
we use kernel routing policies. Each routing table is associated with a mark and we use
Netfilter’s connection tracking to label new connections with the mark corresponding to the
new table. Policies match the mark individual packets carry to specific routing tables.
4.5.4 Application-Specific Routing
As mentioned earlier both the operating system’s core routing functions and the core of the
TNT router make IP-based routing decisions. At the same time it makes sense to configure
traffic routing preferences based on high-level context coming from the transport and appli-
cation layer. For instance by default TNT must only handle IP packets belonging to TCP
port 80 flows (HTTP) while HTTPS and any other traffic must not be affected. By default
Linux uses a global routing table which affects all packets and is not suitable to our needs.
To achieve the necessary flexibility we use routing policies which are combined with multiple
3 Since version 2.6.19 the Linux kernel supports up to 232 routing tables and efficiently addresses them
using a hash table. Previous versions supported up to 255 routing tables.





















Figure 4.4: CDF of the number of ASes on the network path to each web service. TNT
outperforms ISPs by exposing zero traffic to the Internet for 18.5% as well as achieving
one-hop paths for an additional 19.5%.
routing tables and the Netfilter framework. Using the latter we mark specific connections
or packets based on heuristics such as destination port. Marked packets subsequently are
matched to specific routing policies leading to corresponding routing tables. For example
we have a IP routing table that is only used for TCP flows to port 80. The system’s default
table is never modified and, unless we explicitly mark outgoing packets, traffic is routed as
if TNT is not present.
4.6 Evaluation
4.6.1 Network Proximity
We quantify the exposure of plain-text traffic to adversaries by mapping the network paths
to popular websites using a series of Internet vantage points. We then compare the results to
a TNT deployment in the AWS and Azure cloud networks to evaluate the ability of TNT to
minimize traffic exposure. For our measurements we used a total of 7 vantage points spread
across the US and western Europe; 4 virtual machines in the Amazon Web Services (AWS)




















Figure 4.5: CDF of the reduction in ASes on a network path when using TNT as opposed
to an ISP. TNT offers at least 33% in 70% of the cases.
and Microsoft Azure (Azure) cloud, 2 end-user lines in ISPs and access to a fast academic
network. Our set of hosts was compiled by visiting the home page of 9,944 popular web
domains according to Alexa with phantomJS, a Webkit-based, Javascript-capable headless
web browser, and collecting HTTP requests. Our final list, including the initial domains,
contains 34,893 unique domains resolved to 20,026 distinct IP addresses.
Our network mapping process correlates active network measurements with BGP routing
views [72]. This is the same process followed by the forward probes of the TNT router to
discover network paths. To measure the actual flow of packets between one of our vantage
points and each web server in our data set we sent ICMP type 8 as well as TCP+SYN
port 80 packets to the destination host and elicited ICMP type 11 responses packets from
all intermediate network devices using varying TTL values in the header. Some network
policies drop ICMP packets and firewalls at the destination might drop all packets but the
ones the service is expecting. By using port 80 for web services we guarantee minimal
disturbance for our measurements. In section 4.5 we discussed how forward probes of the
TNT routing receive the same information so as to conduct their measurements with packets
that are guaranteed to reach their destination undisturbed. Nevertheless some network
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policies silently drop TTL-expired packets so we only considered complete network paths
for which we had identified all their hops ending up with data for 15,020 of the original 20,026
hosts. We subsequently resolved the IP addresses of each hop in the network paths to their
respective AS using BGP prefix announcements collected by APNIC. Finally we verified the
accuracy of our measurements by correlating the derived AS paths with BGP views 4 from
looking glass platforms. Our methodology guarantees an accurate picture in the case of
transit, i.e., customer-provider, relationships between ASes while leaving a margin of error
in the case of peering agreements where BGP announcements are not available outside the
participating ASes. In production the TNT router will ignore AS paths produced by active
measurements that cannot be verified through BGP announcements.
Figure 4.4 presents the CDF of proximity, in terms of ASes involved, of each vantage
point to the web hosts in our data set. We define this as our exposure metric, indicating
the number of potential network adversaries, which the TNT architecture aims to eliminate
or minimize. A distance of zero ASes in the figure translates to the server being in the
same AS as our TNT link. Similarly a distance of one AS indicates a direct, peering
relationship between our trusted AS and the AS of the server. One may observe that the
TNT architecture outperforms end-user ISP and university networks by routing packets to
18.5% of destinations through ideal, adversary-free, paths. Note that TNT also outperforms
the individual cloud networks we used. Zero hop network paths in the case of ISPs are
attributed to CDNs hosted in their networks and occurs in less than 0% and 5% of the
cases respectively. Since end-user ISPs are part of our threat model we do not consider
these paths adversary-free. We have also calculated the average proximity of TNT to the
home page of each domain as a whole, including all subresources. The results are consistent
with figure 4.4. Similar results describe the proximity of TNT to advertisement networks.
Additionally, TNT offers consistently shorter paths to almost all destinations tested. Figure
4.5 shows that we achieve at least 33% and 50% shorter paths in 70% and 40% of the cases.
From a privacy perspective one might be skeptical about funneling their traffic to a
few large cloud providers. Note that this traffic is already transiting the public Internet in
plain text. As TNT scales, traffic is distributed closer to its destination and user privacy
4http://as-rank.caida.org, http://lg.he.net/
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improves. Nevertheless one could use TNT to only access destinations that are hosted in
the clouds it maintains tunnels with, which is almost 20%.
4.6.2 Operating a TNT router
The TNT router is our implementation of topology-aware tunneling for clients to use. To
quantify its impact on the end user’s system or other network gateway we carried out a web
browsing session that generated realistic network traffic patterns for the router to handle.
We instrumented Firefox to visit in succession the home pages of 1,000 popular web domains
according to Alexa. Firefox waited for each page to fully load before moving on to the next
and we cleared its cache between sessions. HTTPS traffic was unaffected by TNT and was
routed through the default interface. Plain-text HTTP was dominant as shown in section
4.4.
Our evaluation focuses on the impact the router has on the system’s resources and is
expressed in hits in the routing table, the number of concurrently active routing tables as
described in section 4.5 and the number of entries found in the effective routing table over
time. The first measure determines the amount of active network measurements necessary.
The second and third measures determine the stress on the system’s CPU and memory.
Initially we measured how quickly the operating system’s routing table converged to
its optimal configuration so that each IP packet is routed through the tunnel that exits
closest to its destination. An IP packet with a destination address for which we do not
yet have an explicit route is classified as a lookup miss and results in forward probes
mapping and assessing the path to that destination. On the other hand, a destination
address for which TNT knows the best way to reach it has an entry in the routing table and
constitutes a lookup hit. Figure 4.6 presents the hit ratio over time. One may observe that
approximately for the first 500 connections TNT has enough optimal routes to satisfy 50%
of the destinations involved. This indicates a fast bootstrap phase. Over time the hit ratio
increases and by the end of the browsing session we see that TNT was able to satisfy almost
80% of the destination lookups. For subsequent browsing sessions the hit ratio remains
between 100% and 98%. The slight drop is attributed to sites with dynamic content.
The TNT router adds a network-specific route, associated with a metric, for every
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Figure 4.6: Ratio of optimal versus suboptimal TNT routing over time. Initially the ratio
is low causing forward probes to map network paths. Later on it quickly rises indicating
that few popular destinations have been mapped.
destination the distance to which has been determined by the forward probes. As the user
visits more and more unique Internet destinations the routing table grows. Web browsing is
a representative example of this scenario as it involves a plethora of different servers. Figure
4.7 presents the number of routing entries in the effective routing table over time. Note that
the effective routing table is the one the operating system will use to look up the destinations
of new connections. During the initial browsing session the size of the routing tables reaches
approximately 1,400 entries. That might seem daunting compared to the initial 2 entries for
most systems with a single network interface. However the implementation of the routing
table (fib table) in Linux is highly efficient5. It uses hash tables to lookup destinations
in near constant time. The only way the number of entries impacts the system is in terms
of memory consumption. However the way route information is stored in data structures
is also efficient as it groups common parameters between routes to a single data structure
(fib info) that is shared by all routes. In practice the memory overhead for the number
of routes TNT introduces is negligible even for embedded systems such as home routers.
5 http://lxr.linux.no/linux+v3.19/include/net/ip fib.h
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Figure 4.7: Number of entries in the system’s effective routing table. The TNT router
creates explicit entries per AS as part of its operation. In practice memory consumption is
negligible and processing time near constant.
Note that we periodically expire routes that have not been recently involved in lookups.
In order to ensure a smooth transition when updating the routing table the TNT router
uses auxiliary tables as described in section 4.5. Visiting a page causes multiple connections
to be created in an asynchronous bursty manner which may result in an equally bursty set
of routing table updates. Figure 4.8 shows how the system converges from multiple routing
tables to a single one. Multiple tables are used only during routing updates which are
infrequent. We argue that web browsing models the worst case scenario in terms of traffic
patterns and so this figure sets an empirical upper bound on multiple routing policies and
tables.
4.6.3 Web Browsing over TNT
To quantify the effect TNT has on the web browsing experience we studied the round-trip
time (RTT) of packets towards the respective servers along with the overall load time for
each page. Note that we measured RTT from the client’s perspective. Her packets had to
traverse a TNT link, reach the cloud network and then proceed to their final destination.
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Figure 4.8: Number of routing tables concurrently active. Following an update, existing
connections keep using the previous version of the table to avoid disruptions. In practice
memory and processing overhead are negligible.
Our baseline was an academic network with a fast Internet connection in the east coast of
the US. In terms of network latency, as figure 4.9 shows, TNT offers comparable times to
our baseline. We sent TCP packets to destination port 80. In terms of page load time figure
4.10 shows consistent results between TNT and the baseline.
4.7 Security Discussion
For destinations hosted in the cloud a passive Internet adversary sees an end-to-end en-
crypted connection. Examples are servers A and B in figure 4.1. Such destinations are the
primary use case for TNT so clients can reach them without exposing plain-text traffic to
the Internet. Optionally, TNT may also leverage the cloud as a gateway to reach arbitrary
Internet destinations over shorter unencrypted paths. Such example is server C in figure
4.1 where only the path between the cloud and the server is unencrypted. We have shown
that in such cases TNT always creates shorter paths. There is however a tradeoff between
reducing the number of ASes observing plain-text traffic and routing it through networks
that may not have originally observed it. Especially ASes adjacent to the cloud may seem






















Figure 4.9: RTT of packets routed either through a fast academic network or a TNT link
to AWS.
at an advantageous position to monitor the browsing behavior of TNT users. However we
do not observe any notable deviation in the shape of the frequency distribution of ASes
involved when TNT is present. Without TNT the most frequent AS is found in 22.5% of
the paths and with TNT the most frequent AS is found in 19% of the paths. These are
two different ASes and naturally, because of our routing decisions, some ASes see more and
others less traffic. However, as far as users are concerned there is no single AS that can
observe more of their browsing history than without TNT. This can be explained by cloud
providers having multiple upstream providers for redundancy and load balancing reasons.
In fact, the diversity of ASes involved actually increases.
When the cloud is used as a gateway by TNT it appears to be the source of clients’ traffic
at the IP level. This facilitates TNT routing. We do not attempt to hide or anonymize the
source or destination of traffic. ASes observing encrypted client traffic entering the cloud
and unencrypted traffic exiting the cloud can attribute cloud-originating traffic back to a
particular client. An adversary can use the timing and size of packets to match encrypted
flows between clients and the cloud to plain-text traffic between the cloud and external sites.
Cover traffic and shaping techniques may obfuscate such heuristics. However, we argue that


























Figure 4.10: Load time of sessions routed either through a fast academic network or a TNT
link to AWS.
the actual content of plain-text traffic carries a plethora of information that can identify
users. For instance HTTP cookies, referrers and search terms are much more reliable in
tracking users than the IP address of the device originating the traffic.
One might observe that the measurements in Section 4.4 identify content delivery net-
works (CDNs) as popular locations for hosting web services. While they may not be the
true origin of web services, from the client’s perspective these are the networks it needs to
contact to fetch content. By reducing the exposure of traffic to those networks we are able
to benefit the security of individual clients that may be targeted or profiled by a network
adversary. It is possible that an adversary targets traffic between the CDN and its original
server. We expect such traffic to be user-agnostic as the nature of CDNs describes optimiz-
ing the delivery of the same content to a large audience. Thus monitoring such traffic is
unlikely to enable profiling an individual client and altering that traffic is more likely to be
noticed because of the delivery scale.
An active adversary could try to either block our ability to map network paths or falsify
the data we receive. It could also try to block TNT links. To make TNT network measure-
ments resistant to blocking we tailor our probes to the packets a specific service is expecting
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to receive. For HTTP we transmit IP packets with a TCP header indicating destination
port 80. An adversary blocking such packets would also stop actual user traffic towards a
service. Fingerprinting traffic generated by TNT measurements is possible though. Instead
of blocking our network measurements an adversary could tamper with the data we receive
by spoofing responses from upstream routers. However in section 4.6 we describe how we
correlate network paths resulting from data plane measurements with AS paths from BGP
announcements. A measured path that is infeasible is not taken into consideration by TNT.
Attacks against BGP are beyond the scope of this work and any solution is orthogonal. An
active adversary situated between the client and the cloud could try to prevent TNT links
from being established. Our threat model does not include censorship and failure to run
TNT in a network should warn users about the operator’s intentions.
Finally it might seem that TNT centralizes traffic flows within a few cloud networks
which become appealing targets. However our threat model focuses on adversaries that are
not powerful enough to attack the cloud but can carry out passive and active attacks today
because of their location on the Internet. This includes ISPs and other infrastructure oper-
ators. Moreover the key idea behind TNT is to utilize cloud networks to reach destinations
already hosted within them. Therefore adversaries powerful enough to attack the cloud
gain no advantage from the presence of TNT. As an additional, entirely optional, use for
TNT we propose routing traffic to Internet destinations outside the cloud so as to minimize
the network path to them. While this makes such traffic available to adversaries capable of
compromising cloud networks we argue that the benefit of shielding plain text traffic from
every other adversary on the Internet presents an appealing tradeoff. At the same time the
TNT architecture benefits from and encourages scaling to more cloud networks. We thus
expect that individual clouds will see a decrease in the traffic going through.
4.8 Limitations
TNT maps network paths using IP-based measurements. It cannot identify hops operating
below OSI layer 3 such as in the case of MPLS tunnels. As a result it will misrepresent
the length of network paths featuring such traffic encapsulation. This is not a limitation
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of the TNT architecture but a constraint imposed by our implementation of network mea-
surements. Gueye et al. [73] can approximate the geographical location of an IP host in the
presence of loaded links. They use a set of known landmarks to compare the perceived end-
to-end network delay to expected propagation time of the underlying physical links. Using
the existing TNT distributed architecture we could approximate the location of network
hops on the Internet and highlight hops that appear adjacent at layer 3 but are separated
by a great physical distance such as in the case of an overseas or cross-country link.
TNT relies on active measurements which it correlates with BGP announcements pas-
sively collected from looking glass platforms. While BGP policies are complex and based
on confidential agreements between networks we do not depend on the need to interpret
them. Instead, our active measurements, such as traceroute, provide the actual path of
packets based on those policies which we treat as a black box. By design the measurements
approximate the actual client traffic that will follow so for instance we use TCP packets
sent to destination port 80. We use BGP announcements to validate our measurements
and complement them in the case of hops which are incompatible with our methodology,
e.g., routers which do not return ICMP type 11 responses when the TTL of an IP packet
expires on them. We also view BGP hijacking as an orthogonal problem. Hijacking routes
combined with interfering with active measurements to hide network hops is a threat we
consider out of scope.
TNT gives clients the network perspective of the tunnels they are using. This might
affect how they experience systems that depend on the client’s network location. For exam-
ple, DNS replies for load balancing or geo-location purposes will be based off the tunnel’s IP
address instead of the client’s. Because of the inherently inaccurate nature of IP address-
based geo-location systems there are existing mitigations to improve the user experience.
For example, search engines allow users to set their preferred language if they are misiden-
tified as coming from a different country. The nature of the cloud itself is to expand with
additional data centers close to services and their clients. Given this, we expect a gradual
reduction of split network views between the client’s original network and the vantage point
offered by TNT.
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4.9 Production
Modern clients are already taking advantage of the infrastructure-as-a-service platforms
and the cloud specifically to expand their capabilities in terms of processing power, storage
and network access. For example, users are able to sync data between devices, exceed their
device’s storage capacity by offloading excessive data to networks disks and render content
using CPU as well as network resources available on remote machines [3]. We envision that
TNT is the next step in accessing network services securely. Clients that are already using
the cloud [23] to reduce their data usage when surfing the web can adopt TNT in a similar
manner.
TNT will be transparent to end users who will not have to maintain it or be aware of
its presence. Software updates can deliver TNT to their devices and home routers. Using
any kind of resource of course carries a financial cost. How that financial cost is absorbed
is an open question for many of the existing uses of the cloud. For example, most of
Google services are not directly billed to end users. The cost of services deploying and
maintaining TLS and other security features is handled by the Internet services themselves
as the community is trying to promote awareness of good security practices and implicitly
rewards services which apply them. In other words, the cost of TLS is part of doing business.
There is the expectation that users will not make purchases from sites that do not offer TLS.
Perhaps the next step is avoiding sites with poor TLS implementations or sites that the
security community has identified as high risk in terms of traffic exposure. Cloud networks
could also deploy TNT themselves to protect services that choose their networks for hosting
instead of their competition. Such practices are not without precedent. [6]
Overall we think TNT is a tool which acknowledges and leverages the nature of modern
networks. Given its security benefits we are excited to see in what shape or form the
industry will deploy it in practice.




In this dissertation we investigated the hypothesis that user privacy on the web can be
improved by reducing the third parties involved. Towards this goal we presented a design
for privacy-preserving social plugins. Our design effectively removes third parties that are
embedded on websites by decoupling the loading of their content from the user’s visit to
a site. At the same time we are preserving their original functionality which in turn does
not affect usability and acts as an incentive for the adoption of our proposal. Additionally
we presented a network architecture which effectively reduces the networks involved when
routing traffic to a website. By routing otherwise plain-text traffic over our encrypted
overlay we are reducing the intermediate nodes clients and servers have to trust when
exchanging traffic.
We also investigated the hypothesis that such privacy benefits could be accomplished
unilaterally through client-side initiatives and without affecting the operation of individ-
ual websites. We demonstrated that browsers have the technical capability to offer lo-
cally the personalized content and functionality of social plugins and implemented our
proposal without the need for cooperation from social networks. We also demonstrated
that infrastructure-as-a-service has expanded the network access of clients. Specifically it
has made it possible for them to deploy a secure overlay that allows them to reach a web
server without the need to trust intermediate networks with their traffic.
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5.2 Future Directions
As an increasing part of daily life is moving to the Internet, preserving user privacy becomes
an issue of utmost importance. From third parties accumulating user data in exchange
for personalized web content to more and more everyday devices being connected to the
Internet, there are significant challenges to ensuring transparency and control for users.
To this end we introduced novel designs for privacy-preserving content personalization in
online social networking platforms as well as reducing third parties privy to the user’s
network activity. However there are interesting challenges ahead. The following research
directions capture our vision towards user privacy in respect to the evolution of the Internet.
We argue that user data should effectively reside on the client and that the client should
interact only with the user’s intended destination when explicitly sharing this data. Given
the evidence presented in this thesis such requirements are aligned with the nature, function
and evolution of the web.
5.2.1 Decentralizing User Data
There are open issues towards addressing the privacy concerns behind social networking
services and other ubiquitous third parties around the web storing user data. The former
receive user data in exchange for some functionality users enjoy while the latter amasses
data about the users based on their web browsing activity. Existing research has focused
on blocking the interaction between users and those parties, an approach appealing only
to those users willing to trade functionality for privacy. Work that tries to prevent third
parties from holding on to user data, based on whether such data retention is beneficial
or expected from the user’s perspective, ends up participating in an arms race with those
services. For example Google and Facebook are both first-party services users visit and
third-party trackers profiling the users’ web browsing, thus making the separation non-
trivial. At the same time third-party trackers are actively trying to detect and evade such
black-listing technologies, e.g., third-party cookie blocking, ad-blocking software and private
browsing windows.
We argue that future research should focus towards ways to empower users by giving
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them control over their data while defining transparent ways for data sharing. The existing
monolithic system of web services interweaves the functionality they offer, e.g., an online
social graph, with the user-generated content overlaid on top of it. In this thesis we have
demonstrated a practical design principle for online social networks that addresses the
simultaneous first and third-party nature of Facebook and prevents user tracking from
widgets embedded in websites the user visits while preserving the functionality of those
widgets including their personalized content. A key aspect of our design is avoiding direct
interaction with Facebook when user-owned data can be placed on their devices and used
to render personalized content locally. We have proven that user agents are capable of
implementing such design and we argue that the next step is to focus on making clients the
sole carriers of user-generated content. Towards this direction we should explore moving all
user data away from such monolithic services in favor of peer-to-peer user interactions. A
limitation of our current work is that if users choose to interact with social widgets, e.g.,
“Like” a page, that information is written back to Facebook and thus reveals their visit to a
particular site. The fundamental principle of making user devices the only place their data
lives gives users better control by default and promotes transparency as Facebook will have
to make explicit data requests towards clients and justify them.
While one could argue that clients are unequipped to handle their data we have demon-
strated the practicality of such approach by implementing our design. The next step is to
leverage the cloud as a private syncing medium across devices, a privacy-preserving process-
ing environment and a privacy-friendly facilitator of user-to-user data sharing. We argue
that the growth of infrastructure-as-a-service technologies has extended the concept of a
client beyond the physical confines of a device. Future research should revisit the privacy
of user data given the evolution in the nature of clients that involves multiple user-owned
devices, private off-device storage, processing and networking capabilities in the cloud.
5.2.2 Revisiting the Security Model of Client-Server Interactions
Given that TNT redefines a client’s proximity to services in the cloud, it can benefit current
work in Internet measurements and security as well as drive new research. At the same
time Sherry et al. [98] describe how the cloud can offer middleboxes as a service. The cloud
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becomes the point of ingress and egress for enterprise networks and implements proxies,
firewalls and load balancers. Going forward this makes the cloud the rendezvous point for
clients interacting with servers over the Internet. As a result, new research can focus on
intra-cloud traffic under a more simplified threat model and improved network conditions.
For example routing attacks [100] in the Internet’s backbone are less likely inside a
cloud network which is controlled by a single operator. TNT transforms reliable routing
into two orthogonal problems; reliably routing to the cloud and reliably routing within
the cloud. Factoring in the implicit trust placed by users to the cloud networks hosting
the services they are trying to access creates an interesting research space that can yield
practical solutions.
As the industry, represented by AT&T and Google, is trying to standardize middle-
boxes [11,12], being able to reliably detect their presence is an interesting and crucial area
of research. TNT assumes cloud networks are trusted and therefore does not consider at-
tacks against plain text traffic between a TNT endpoint and its destination while in those
networks. In practice, cloud providers may themselves employ middleboxes internally that
process, cache or alter traffic. For example a legitimate IDS could cache the plain text
user data it processes. We argue that the presence of such IDS should be transparent to
users. While existing research [62,66,87,104] has identified middleboxes based on implemen-
tations that make their traffic distinguishable from actual clients, a motivated adversary
can implement a middlebox that mimics the network stack of end-user systems. We ar-
gue that middlebox detection has to rely on fundamental aspects of their nature. Until
now research towards this direction has been hindered by the volatile geography of the
Internet’s backbone. However, as the attack surface has shifted from the backbone to the
cloud, existing security research can be revisited and new research may be enabled. For
example, accurately determining the geographic location of a server can highlight an ad-
versarial network tampering with traceroute. Because constraint-based geolocation [73,89]
uses delay measurements to estimate the location of Internet hosts it does not perform well
when the targets are not close to the landmarks. Topology-based geolocation [77] lever-
ages the network topology to improve on delay-based measurements but it introduces the
additional challenge of accurately mapping the data plane. Volatile network latency and
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packet loss rates could become more reliable [74] in the smaller core of a cloud network. In
other words, TNT narrows the search area from the backbone to cloud networks and IP
geolocation appears to benefit from the nature of the cloud.
Going forward, detecting middleboxes in low-latency cloud networks may be possible by
identifying the delay added by those middleboxes as a fundamental result of their processing.
In contrast to a typical router, such devices use a high-level function to process network
packets prior to forwarding them to their intended destination. Such processing, usually
deep packet inspection, increases the round-trip time between the client and the server.
Intelligently created packets the processing of which exacerbates the delay introduced by
the middlebox but does not affect the operation of the legitimate the server can highlight
the presence of a middlebox. If the client observes timing discrepancies between regular
packets and tripwires it can conclude that a middlebox is interfering with the traffic. For
instance, sslstrip [41] rewrites a server’s HTML response to replace all https:// links
with the insecure http:// scheme so it can monitor the client’s future traffic. This may
result in passwords and other sensitive information being transmitted in plain text. An
sslstrip tripwire can be a pair of pages, one with a large number of https:// links to
be stripped and one without. Tripwires have to generate timing discrepancies above the
natural network noise. Therefore they are most effective in low-latency networks involving
few hops. Rethinking client-server interactions over the Internet in the context of the local
network inside the cloud is an interesting direction.
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